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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW*
This is a review of important decisions handed down by the
Supreme Court of North Dakota during 1980. The purpose of this
review is to serve as a convenient overview of important decisions
and, in some cases, as a summary of the effect that these decisions
will have on North Dakota law. Not all decisions from this period
are discussed; only those which may have significant impact on
North Dakota law are included.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Shackelford v. Social Service Board
In Shackelford v. Social Service Board,' Shackelford appealed a
decision of the Social Service Board (Board) to terminate her
AFDC2 benefits as of March 1, 1978.1 The Board had originally
determined that Shackelford was entitled to AFDC benefits after
March 1st. This determination, however, was based on misleading
statements by Shackelford that she had not been properly notified
of an appeal hearing regarding her eligibility.4 Subsequent to the
original determination, the Board learned of the conflicting
statements, 5 reopened the case, 6 and redetermined in a formal
hearing that Shackelford's benefits should have been terminated as
of March 1, 1978.1
In affirming the action taken by the Board,8 the supreme court
made two significant findings. First, the court found that
Shackelford was not denied her due process rights by the ex parte
determination of the administrative agency to reopen the case. 9
The court reasoned that due process does not require an
administrative agency to grant a hearing to an individual every
time a decision is reached that will affect that individual. 1
The court also held that the Board's reconsideration process
was proper even though final action was not taken within the time
period specified by federal regulations." The court stated that the
federal regulations were not "ironclad," but required only
substantial compliance by the states. 2 Further, the court found it
inconceivable that Congress intended otherwise ineligible persons
1. 299 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 1980).
2. The overall statutory structure of the Aid To Families With Dependent Children (AFDC)
program is found at 42 U.S.C.A. 5 602 (West 1974 & Supp. 1980).
3. Shackelford v. Social Serv. Bd., 299 N.W.2d 549, 550 (N.D. 1980).
4. Id. at 550-51.
5. Id. at 551.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 552.
8. Id. at 557.
9. Id. at 555. The appellant argued that the county social service board's request to the Social
Service Board of North Dakota (SSB) to reopen the case was of greater importance than the SSB's
rehearing. Id. The supreme court, however, held that the SSB's decision to reopen the case was part
of an "internal request for review" which did not require notifying the appellant or providing her
with an opportunity to cross-examine. Id.
10. Id. at 554-55.
11. Id. at 557. The federal regulations require that "[pirompt, definitive, and final ad-
.ministrative action shall be taken within 90 days from the date of the request for a hearing." 45
C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (16) (1979). In the present case, the hearing and rehearing process took ap-
proximately eight months. 299 N.W.2d at 550-52. Much of the delay, however, was "attributable to
the requests and later unavailability of Shackelford." Id. at 556.
12. 299 N.W.2d at 556 (citing to Shands v. Tull, 602 F.2d 1156, 1160 (3d Cir. 1979)).
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to benefit by giving misleading information to the Board when the
agency acted within a reasonable time. 13
Balliet v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
In Balliet v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 14 the
supreme court reinstated awards made by the Workmen's
Compensation Bureau (Bureau) for claims filed as a result of the
death of an employee. 15 The Bureau found that the employee
suffered from a pre-existing heart condition 16 and, pursuant to the
aggravation statute, 17  awarded fifty percent of the benefits
otherwise payable.' 8 Although the court found the Bureau's
application of the law proper in this case, 19 the court did set
limitations on the Bureau's ability to apply section 65-05-15 of the
North Dakota Century Code. 20 The Bureau argued that the word
"condition" in the aggravation statue allowed it to reduce a
compensation claim when a claimant's pre-existing condition was
not a disabling condition.2 The court, however, construed the
statute to mean that the Bureau could prorate benefits only when a
claimant's pre-existing condition was "accompanied by an actual
impairment or disability known in advance of the work-related
injury.' '22
13. 299 N.W.2d at 557.
14. 297 N.W.2d 791 (N.D. 1980).
15. Balliet v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 297 N.W.2d 791, 792 (N.D.
1980).
16. Id. at 793.
17. N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-05-15 (Supp. 1979). The statute provides in part:
Compensation shall not be paid for any condition which existed prior to the happening
of a compensable injury nor for any disability chargeable to such condition. In case of
aggravation of a condition existing prior to a compensable injury, compensation,
medical or hospital expenses, or death benefits, shall be allowed by the bureau and
paid from the fund only for such proportion of the disability, death benefits, or ex-
pense arising from the aggravation of such prior condition as reasonably may be at-
tributable to such compensable injury. If the degree of aggravation cannot be deter-
mined, the percentage award shall be fifty percent of total benefits recoverable if one
hundred percent of total injury had been the result of employment.
18. 297 N.W.2d at 793. The Bureau found that the worker's heart attack and death resulted
both from his employment and from a pre-existing heart condition. The Bureau, however, was
unable to determine precisely what share each cause had in the worker's fatal attack. Id. Because
the aggravation statute provides that when the degree of aggravation of a pre-existing condition
cannot be determined the compensable award shall be fifty percent of the benefits otherwise due,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15 (Supp. 1979), the Bureau awarded compensation on a fifty percent
aggravation basis. 297 N.W. 2d at 793.
The district court had increased the compensation award by granting greater benefits to the
appellees. The district court found "problems with both the aggravation statute and the Bureau's
construction of it .... " Id. at 792. The supreme court, however, reinstated the Bureau's award, and
held that the Bureau's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and that the Bureau's
determinations were in accordance with the law. Id. at 796.
19. 297 N.W.2d at 796.
20. Id. at 795-96. A portion of the current aggravation statute is reprinted supra at note 17.
21. 297 N.W.2d at 794. Statutory language is found supra at note 17.
22. 297 N.W.2d at 794. The court also stated that its present decision was consistent with its
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The court also rejected Balliet's argument that the aggravation
statute 23 was not applicable to an employment injury resulting in
death. 24 The court recognized that the statutory language was
arguably ambiguous as to whether "death" was a disability
covered by the statute,25 but concluded that it was the clear
intention of the legislature that fatal injuries be subject to
apportionment. 26
American State Bank v. State Banking Board
In American State Bank v. State Banking Board,27 the existing
financial institutions in the city of Williston appealed a decision of
the State Banking Board (Board) granting a charter to a new full-
service commercial bank in Williston. 28 The appellants protested
the Board's finding that the city was in "need" of a new bank29 and
questioned the Board's withholding of personal financial
statements of the prospective incorporators. 30
In affirming the Board's decision, the supreme court found
that the term "need" in section 6-02-06 of the North Dakota
Century Code, 31 which provides for inquiries to be made by the
Board in determining whether to accept an application to establish
a new banking institution, does not require a showing of absolute
necessity for a new banking facility in a given area. 32 The court
reasoned that the general purpose of the banking regulation was to
protect the public and to promote and ensure safe and healthy
banking operations, but not to foster monopolies. 33 The court
found that the legislature's use of the term "need" was intended to
require the Board to look at all available facts when determining
whether a proposed location is in need of further banking
facilities. 34 The facts the court found relevant were the economic
decision in Wolfv. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 267 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1978),
"which was decided under the earlier version of section 65-05-15." 297 N.W.2d at 794.
23. N.D. CENT. CoDE S 65-05-15 (Supp. 1979).
24. 297 N.W.2d at 795.
25. Id. A portion of the aggravation statute is reprinted supra at note 17.
26. 297 N.W.2d at 795-96.
27. 289 N.W.2d 222 (N.D. 1980).
28. American State Bank v. State Banking Bd., 289 N.W.2d 222, 224-25 (N.D. 1980).
29. Id. at 226-27.
30. Id. at 229.
31. N.D. CENT. CODE S 6-02-06 (Supp. 1979). The statute was amended in the 1979 Legislative
Session. 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 121, § 2. The statute provides that "the board diligently shall
inquire whether the place where such banking association is proposed to be located is in need of
further banking facilities .. " N.D. CENT. CODE §6-02-06(Supp. 1979).
This action was controlled by the statute as it existed before it was amended in 1979 by the
legislature. 289 N.W.2d at 226. The amended form of the statute, however, is almost identical to its
original form; only the sentence requiring the applicant to pay a fee to defray the cost of investigation
and a hearingwas deleted. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-02-06 (Supp. 1979).
32. 289 N.W.2d at 227.
33._Id. (citing to N.D. CENT. CODE 5 6-01-04 (1975)).
34. 289 N.W.2d at 227.
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feasibility of the proposed bank,3 5 the overall protection of the
public interest, 36 and the existence of a reasonable public demand
for a new banking facility. 37
The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the
Board committed reversible error when it withheld, as confidential,
the personal financial statements of the proposed incorporators
from the protesting banks' counsel. 38 The court reasoned that even
if the Board had acted improperly in withholding the information,
the information was available to the Board and was considered by
the Board in making its determination. 39
Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota Employment Security Bureau
In Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota Employment Security
Bureau, 40 the court confronted the issue of whether church schools
are subject to taxation under the state's unemployment
compensation laws. 41 The North Dakota Employment Security
Bureau (Bureau) contended that the 1977 legislative amendment of
section 52-01-01 (13) (h) of the North Dakota Century Code, 42
eliminating the tax exemption for primary and secondary schools,
had extended the state's unemployment compensation coverage to
employees of church schools. 43
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the Bureau's
interpretation of the statute and held that church schools do not
come within the scope of the unemployment compensation laws. 44
The court's decision was based on two grounds. First, the court
35. Id.
36. Id. at 228.
37. Id. at 227 (citingJackson v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 277 Minn. 293, 295, 152 N.W.2d 472, 474
(1967)).
38. 289 N.W.2d at 229. The appellants argued that if "information were available, the
protesting banks would have had an opportunity to cross-examine the incorporators as to the
information supplied." Id. at 230.
39. Id. The information was also available to the district court, the supreme court, and to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation inspectors.
40. 294 N.W.2d 767 (N.D. 1980).
41. Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota Employment Security Bureau, 294 N.W.2d 767,
769-70 (N.D. 1980). North Dakota's unemployment compensation laws are found at N.D. CENT.
COnE tit. 52 (1974 & Supp. 1979).
42. N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-01 (13) (h) (Supp. 1979) (amending S 52-01-01 (13) (h) (1974)).
The statute excludes particular types of employment from the requirements of the unemployment
compensation laws. Id.
43. 294 N.W.2d at 770. To conform with federal law, the North Dakota legislature deleted
section 52-01-01(13) (h) (3) which had excluded all schools which were not institutions of higher
education from the requirements of unemployment compensation legislation. Id. at 769. See 1977
N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 495, S4.
In 1978 the United States Department of Labor issued a directive to all state employment
agencies that required them to assess unemployment compensation taxes against church schools.
(Church-related elementary and secondary schools were covered by the federal employment
compensation laws.) 294 N.W.2d at 769. For a discussion of the Labor Department's directive, see
Comment, Bringing Christian Schools Within The Scope of the Unemployment Compensation Laws: Statutory
and Free Exercise Laws, 25 VILL. L. REV. 69 (1979).
44. 294 N.W.2d at 774.
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considered the issue on statutory grounds, concluding that
coverage of church schools was not statutorily mandated.4 5 Because
section 52-01-01 (13) (h) of the North Dakota Century Code still
provided an exemption for all services performed in the employ of a
church or an association of churches, 46 the court reasoned that the
legislature could not have intended to extend coverage to all
elementary and secondary schools, 47  nor could it have
accomplished such an extension. 48 The court also found that
treating church schools as employers for purposes of the
unemployment laws was not constitutionally permissible. 49
ATTORNEYS
In re Lovell
The North Dakota Supreme Court considered several cases
involving the professional ethics of attorneys. In In re Lovell, 5 0 a
letter of informal complaint was filed against a member of the
North Dakota Bar. The Inquiry Committee East of the State Bar
Association of North Dakota conducted an investigation and
recommended that Lovell be issued a private reprimand. 51 The
Disciplinary Board disagreed and instituted formal disciplinary
proceedings. The three-member hearing panel heard the complaint
and concluded that Lovell had violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by his negligence and delay in the handling of
certain estates, and by his failure to maintain proper
communication with his clients. 52 The panel recommended that
Lovell be publicly reprimanded for his misconduct and that he be
required to pay for the expense of the disciplinary proceedings. 5 3
The supreme court rejected these conclusions and
recommendations, observing initially that the court does not act as
a mere rubber stamp of the Disciplinary Board. 54 The record
indicated that the delays were not solely attributable to Lovell. 55
The court reasoned that all parties involved in the probate of an
estate, including personal representatives, have a duty to
45. Id. at 771-72.
46. N.D. CENT. CODE S 52-01-01 (13)(h)(1) (Supp. 1979).
47. 294 N.W.2d at 771-72.
48. Id. at 772.
49. Id. at 774. See infra notes 160 to 168 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
constitutional aspect of church schools as employers for unemployment law purposes.
50. 292 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1980).
51. In re Lovell, 292 N.W.2d 76, 78 (N.D. 1980).
52. Id. at 81-82.
53. Id. at 82.
54. Id. at 82-86.
55. Id. at 85.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
communicate and cooperate with each other. 56 The court
concluded with the "hope that this opinion will serve as a warning
to attorneys throughout the state that they should carefully re-
examine files in their offices" and take prompt action on those that
could be closed.
57
Application ofAmundson
Another ethical question arose in Application of Amundson. 5 8 In
Amundson, a letter of informal complaint was lodged against a
member of the North Dakota Bar. 59 The three-member disciplinary
panel heard the complaint and determined that Amundson had
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by (1) acting
improperly in the drafting and witnessing of a will in which he was
named as executor and as a beneficiary, (2) failing to communicate
with the beneficiaries of an estate concerning the status of the
estate, and (3) neglecting to take timely and appropriate actions in
the probate of the estate. 60 The panel recommended that
Amundson be publicly reprimanded for his conduct and that he
pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding. 61
The supreme court disagreed with the first of the panel's
conclusions by finding "unusual circumstances ' 62 which justified
Amundson's drafting of a will in which he was named as a
beneficiary. 63 The court, however, agreed that Amundson's
subsequent handling of the estate was improper and that his
conduct warranted the recommended disciplinary action. 64 The
court reasoned that although the drafting of the will was acceptable
under the circumstances, Amundson's discomfort with his role as
drafter of the will led directly to his mishandling of the estate.6 5 The
court recommended that attorneys not draft wills in which they are
named as a beneficiary. Further, the court stated that in the future,
attorneys will have a difficult burden in convincing the court that
unusual circumstances justified their actions in this regard. 66
56. Id.
57. Id. at 86.
58. 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1980).
59. Application ofAmundson, 297 N.W.2d 433, 434 (N.D. 1980).
60. Id. at 436.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 441-42. The court found as "unusual circumstances" the fact that Amundson had a
close personal relationship with the testatrix similar to that of parent and child. Nonetheless, he stood
as one who would be the natural object of her bounty. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 444.
65. Id. at 443.
66. Id. at 442.
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Westchem Agricultural Chemicals, Inc. v. Engel
The defendant in Westchem Agricultural Chemicals, Inc. v. Enge167
was assessed $1,016.50 in attorney's fees as a result of his default in
a contract action. The district court denied the defendant's motion
to amend that part of the judgment which allowed the fees.
Defendant subsequently appealed to the North Dakota Supreme
Court, contending that the award of attorney's fees was improper
in a default proceeding. 68
The supreme court recognized section 28-26-31 of the North
Dakota Century Code69 as the controlling statute and found that
the district court had not complied with the statute's
requirements. 70 The supreme court noted that the lower court had
not summarily awarded the attorney's fees at the close of the
hearing as required by section 28-26-31.71 Instead, it had abused its
discretion by taking the matter under advisement. 72
The supreme court next addressed the issue of whether the
allowance of attorney's fees is appropriate in a default judgment.
The court relied in part on a good faith analysis, reasoning that
while the moving party may be able to show that the pleadings were
untrue, he usually is unable to demonstrate that his adversary was
acting in bad faith. 73 Thus, an inadvertant mistake in a pleading
would prevent an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the statute. 74
The court noted further that an award of attorney's fees is improper
in a default proceeding because both parties to a controversy must
67. 300 N.W.2d 856 (N.D. 1980).
68. Western Agricultural Chemicals, Inc. v. Engel, 300 N.W.2d 856, 858 (N.D. 1980).
69. Id. at 859. The court determined that section 28-26-31 of the North Dakota Century Code,
not section 28-26-01, applied in this case. Section 28-26-31 provides as follows:
Allegations and denials in any pleadings in court, made without reasonable cause and
not in good faith, and found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the
payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred by the other party by reason of the
untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, to be summarily taxed by
the court at the trial.
N.D. CENT. COnE § 28-26-31 (1969). Section 28-26-01 (2) provides the following:
In civil actions the court may, in its discretion, upon a finding that a claim for relief
was frivolous, award reasonable actual or statutory costs, or both, including
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Such costs may be awarded
regardless of the good faith of the attorney or client making the claim for relief if there
is such a complete absence of actual facts or law that a reasonable person could not
have thought a court would render judgment in their favor, providing the prevailing
party has in responsive pleading alleged the frivolous nature of the claim.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-01(2) (Supp. 1979).
70. 300 N.W.2d at 860.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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be given the opportunity to be heard before the statute can be given
effect. 15
In re Estates of Korvestad
In In re Estates of Kjorvestad, 1 6 the North Dakota Supreme Court
considered whether the fees charged by an attorney for the probate
of two estates were reasonable.77 The appeal was brought by a co-
executrix who complained that the attorney's fees were
unreasonable because the attorney had not acted for the common
benefit of her parents' estates.7 8 The attorney had earlier instituted
removal proceedings against the "uncooperative" co-executrix
who in turn had filed charges against him for unethical conduct. 7 9
The attorney billed the estates for both the removal proceedings
and for his successful defense in the disciplinary action.
The supreme court determined that these fees were
reasonable.80 The court concluded that because the attorney's
attempt to remove the co-executrix was made for the benefit of the
estates and in good faith, it was proper to assess the estates for the
cost of the proceeding. 8' Similarly, because the disciplinary action
was instituted in bad faith, the attorney should be entitled to collect
the cost of his defense from the estates, as long as the accusations
were groundless.8 2 The court also determined that although estate
work was outside of this attorney's tax specialty, a charge of eighty
dollars per hour was not unreasonable. 83
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Medical Arts Building Ltd. v. Eralp
The enforcement of a Canadian judgment in North Dakota
courts was at issue in Medical Arts Building Ltd. v. Eralp.84 The
appellees brought an action on a judgment issued against the
appellant by the County Court of Winnipeg, Manitoba. 85 The
North Dakota Supreme Court also found for the appellee and
75. Id.
76. 287 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1980).
77. In re Estates ofKjorvestad, 287 N.W.2d 465, 467 (N.D. 1980).
78. Id. at 468. The court cited an earlier case involving the same parties in which it held that the
principal factor in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees was whether the legal services
were for the protection of the estate. Conway v. Parker, 250 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1977).
79. 287 N.W.2d at 468-69.
80. Id. at 467.
81. Id. at 468-69.
82. Id. at 469.
83. Id. at 469-70. The court listed twelve factors adopted in an earlier North Dakota case which
aid in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fees. Hughes v. North Dakota Crime
Reparations Bd., 246 N.W.2d 774, 777 (N.D. 1976).
84. 290 N.W.2d 241 (N.D. 1980).
85. Medical Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241, 242 (N.D. 1980).
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issued a judgment in his favor.8 6 In affirming the Canadian
judgment, the supreme court held that foreign judgments are
considered as prima facie evidence.8 7 The court stated that these
judgments should be conclusive unless some special ground exists
for impeaching a judgment, such as fraud or prejudice, or unless
the principles of international law and comity dictate that a
judgment should not be given effect.88
Svard v. Barfield
What constitutes an "appearance" under Rule 55 of the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure89 was considered by the
court in Svard v. Barfield. 90 In Svard, the appellant sought relief from
a default judgment entered against him in a suit for a debt allegedly
due on a construction contract. 91 Two weeks after the suit was
commenced, the appellant met with the appellee to negotiage a
settlement. 92 Neither party was represented by counsel at the
meeting. 93 No answer was filed by the appellant to the complaint
and, without further notice, a default judgment was entered. 94 The
appellant moved for relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 but the
motion was denied. In reversing the judgment, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that appellant's attendance at the negotiation
meeting constituted an appearance under Rule 55(a)(3).96
Therefore, he was entitled to eight days notice before the hearing
on application for default judgment. 97 To hold otherwise, the court
found, would encourage deception. 98
Holloway v. Blue Cross
North Dakota's newly adopted Uniform Class Action Rule99
was examined by the court for the first time in Holloway v. Blue
Cross. 100 The appellee, a retired state employee, brought suit
against an insurer for breach of an agreement to indemnify him for
86. Id. at 243.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 245. Seealso Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895).
89. N.D.R. Civ. P. 55.
90. 291 N.W.2d 434 (N.D. 1980).
91. Svard v. Barfield, 291 N.W.2d 434, 435 (N.D. 1980).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. See N.D.R. Cir. P. 60 (b).
96. 291 N.W.2d at 437. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 55 (a) (3).
97. 291 N.W.2d at 437.
98. Id.
99. N.D.R. Civ. P. 23.
100. 294 N.W.2d 902 (N.D. 1980).
266
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costs incurred in the treatment of alcoholism. 10 1 The appellant
appealed from an order of the Burleigh County district court
certifying the suit as a class action and ordering appellant to answer
interrogatories seeking the names and addresses of other state
employees who had received treatment for alcoholism within a
certain time period. 102
The court concluded that the facts of the case warranted its
certification as a class action because the estimated number of
members in the class was sufficiently large to make joinder
impracticable. Furthermore, the pivotal issue was the same as to all
class members. 103 The court, however, criticized the content of the
certification order. According to the court, although each of the
considerations listed in Rule 23 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure 0 4 need not be discussed in greai detail, the court must
make more than a general statement so that the parties will know
exactly what issues have been given class status, who may comprise
the authorized class, and why the action was given class status. 10 5
As to the discovery of the names and addresses of other state
employees treated for alcoholism, the court remanded the case to
the district court with directions that it devise and supervise a
system of notice for potential plaintiffs that would ensure the
anonymity of any such person who decides not to become a
party. 106
Walsvik v. Brandel
In Walsvik v. Brandel, 107 the supreme court considered, for the
first time, the issue of whether North Dakota's "long-arm
statute" 10 8 supersedes the tolling of a statute of limitations during a
defendant's absence from the state. The appellee in Walsvik was
granted a summary judgment after the running of the statute of
limitations.10 9 The appellant contended that dismissal of the action
was improper, arguing that the statute of limitations was tolled
during the time the appellee was absent from the state. 110 In
reversing the trial court's dismissal of the action, the court
101. Holloway v. Blue Cross, 294 N.W.2d 902, 904 (N.D. 1980). The insurer had contracted to
provide a group medical plan for state employees.
102, Id. at 903.
103. Id. at 907.
104. N.D.R. Civ. P. 23.
105. 294 N.W.2d at 907-08.
106. Id. at 908.
107. 298 N.W.2d 375 (N.D. 1980).
108. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4.
109. Walsvik v. Brandel, 298 N.W.2d 375, 376 (N.D. 1980).
110. Id
267
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determined that section 28-01-32 of the North Dakota Century
Code allows for the tolling of the statute of limitations when a
person leaves the state for a year or more.11' Furthermore,
although Rule 4 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure
would have allowed service while the appellee was out of the state,
any change in the statute based on modern service of process
concepts must be done legislatively. I I2
COMMERCIAL LAW
State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc.
In State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub,
Inc., 113 two issues of first impression were brought before the North
Dakota Supreme Court. This case involved guarantors of leases
covering restaurant equipment and signs entered into by the Bank
as lessor and All-American Sub as lessee. 114 After All-American
Sub defaulted on the agreement, the Bank sent a letter to the
guarantors containing notice of dispositon of the -equipment listed
in the agreement. 1 5 After receiving no reply, the Bank sold the
equipment, applied the proceeds to the past due loan, and sued the
debtor and guarantors for the deficiency. 116 The trial court held in
favor of the Bank and the guarantors appealed. 11 7
The first issue the court considered was whether the lease was
intended as security within the meaning of Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) section 1-201(37). 11 That section provides in part,
"Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the
facts of each case." 119 The court examined whether such a
determination was a question of fact as viewed by some
jurisdictions, 20 or a question of law. 12' The court decided that the
status of a lease as security is a question of law to be determined
from the intent of the parties and the four corners of the writing. 22
Because the lease interpretation is a question of law, the court was
111. Id. at 377.
112. Id.
113. 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980).
114. State Bank ofBurleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772, 774
(N.D. 1980).
115. Id
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 776.
119. U.C.C. § 1-201 (37) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-11 (37) (Supp. 1979)1.
120. 289 N.W.2d at 776. See Burns v. Equilease Corp., 357 So. 2d 786 (Fla. App. 1978);
Granite Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Acme Pump Co., Inc., 165 Conn. 364, 335 A.2d 294 (1973).
121. 289 N.W.2d at 776.
122. Id. See Percival Construction Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir.
1976); Tallackson Potato Co., Inc. v. MTK Potato Co., 278 N.W.2d 417 (N.D. 1979).
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not bound by the lower court's factual findings pursuant to Rule
52(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, and was
therefore free to review all pertinent facts on the issue. 123 The court
examined the evidence indicating the parties' intent and concluded
that the lease of equipment was intended as "security" within
section 41-01-11(37) of the North Dakota Century Code. 124
The second issue of first impression before the court was
whether the failure of the Bank to give notice of intended
disposition of the property bars the Bank's recovery on a deficiency
judgment.125 The court held that the failure of a creditor to give
notice of intended disposition of a debtor's repossessed property
does not bar recovery on a deficiency judgment if the creditor sold
the property for a fair market value and credited the proceeds to the
debtor's account. 126 The court reasoned that this extension of
creditors' rights accords with commercial reasonableness, provided
the creditor has not caused any harm, and proves the sale realized a
fair market value. 127 The court determined that whether the
creditor has acted in a commercially reasonable manner is
essentially a factual question. 128
Erling v. Homera, Inc.
In Erling v. Homera, Inc., 129 the buyer of a mobile home
(Erling) filed suit to revoke acceptance of the mobile home and
demanded return of the purchase price plus interest. 130 Erling
revoked acceptance after the defendants, Homera, Inc., failed for a
year and a half to repair a condensation problem which resulted in
water dripping into the mobile home. 131 The trial court allowed
Erling to revoke acceptance and awarded him the purchase price of
the mobile home without interest. 132 Homera appealed, contending
123. 289 N.W.2d at 776.
124. Id. at 778. The factors that the court used in making this decision included the following:
Provisions in the security agreement whereby the lessee bears the risk of loss; whether the rent
equaled the cost of equipment plus interest; and upon default, whether the lessee is liable for the
unpaid rent and any deficiency after a sale. Id. The court also examined a list of characteristics of a
lease intended as security which included the following: (1) Purchase of the equipment by lessor from
a supplier; (2) guaranty or indemnity by a third party; (3) payment of taxes, insurance, and expenses
by lessee; (4) payment of a security deposit by lessee; (5) option of lessee to purchase equipment or
renew lease at minimal rent; (6) absence of storage facilities of lessor; and (7) lack of evidence
showing the lessor handled any volume of equipment. Id. at 777 (citing Davis Bros. v. Misco
Leasing, 508 S.W.2d 908, 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)).
125. 289 N.W.2d at 779.
126. Id. at 780.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 780.
129. 298 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1980).
130. Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 479 (N.D. 1980).
131. Id. at 479.
132. Id. at 480. The trial court apparently felt that the value of the use of the home and the
interest offset each other. Id.
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that the faulty condition did not substantially impair the value of
the mobile home, thereby precluding revocation. 133 Homera also
argued that Erling had waived his right to rescind the contract by
continuing to make full use of the mobile home after revocation. 134
The court found that Erling justifiably revoked his acceptance
in view of the fact that the water seepage was aggravating, and
because the defendant had adequate time to repair the condition
before Erling's revocation. 135 The court also determined that Erling
had not waived his right to rescind the contract by continued use of
the mobile home after revocation. 136 The court relied on section 41-
02-65 of the North Dakota Century Code, which allows one who
rightfully rejects and who receives no instructions from the seller
the right to store the goods for the seller's account. 137 The court also
applied section 41-02-90 of the North Dakota Century Code which
provides the buyer with a security interest in the goods upon a
justifiable revocation of acceptance of those goods.13 8 Therefore,
because Erling remained in possession of the mobile home both to
store it and to protect his security interest in the home, his
continued possession of the mobile home was not wrongful. 139
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
State v. Shaver
The Supreme Court of North Dakota decided several cases
133. Id.
134. Id. Homera's appeal contained two subissues. The first subissue was whether a finding that
a mobile home complied with government standards meant it was not defectively designed. The
court held that compliance with government standards is not conclusive. Id. at 481. The second
subissue was whether the set-off of interest was a fair and reasonable value of a mobile home. The
case was remanded to determine this issue consistent with sections 9-09-04 and 32-04-23 of the North
Dakota Century Code. 298 N.W.2d at 483-84. Seealso N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-04 (1975); 32-04-23
(1976).
135. 298 N.W.2d at 482. The court noted that a seller does not have an unlimited amount of
time to repair defects. Because the repairs were not made after a year and a half of complaints, the
court held that Erling's refusal to allow further attempts to repair after revocation was not improper.
Id.
136. Id. Homera contended that Erling had wrongfully retained possession as provided in
section 41-02-65 (2) of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. Section 41-02-65 (2) provides in part as
follows: "IS]ubject to the provisions of the two following sections on rejected goods (sections 41-02-
66 and 41-02-67) . . . after rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer with respect to any
commercial unit is wrongful as against the seller. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-65 (2) (a) (1968).
137. 298 N.W.2d at 482.
138. 298 N.W.2d at 483. Section 41-02-90 (3) of the North Dakota Century Code provides in
part as follows:
On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security
interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments made on their price and
any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and
custody and may hold such goods and resell them in like manner as an.aggrieved seller
(section 41-02-85).
N.D. CENT. CODE §41-02-90 (1968).
139. 298 N.W.2d at 483.
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involving constitutional issues. In State v. Shaver, 140 the court upheld
the defendant's conviction for violating the state's compulsory
school attendance laws. 14 1 The defendants were found to be in
violation of the statute because they sent their children to Bible
Baptist School, which was not approved by the county
superintendent of schools or the superintendent of public
instruction as required by statute. 142 The record disclosed that the
school had never sought such approval because it was in
contravention of the defendants' religious beliefs. 143 The evidence
also revealed that the teachers at the school were not certified by the
state as the statute requires. 144
The defendants contended that the compulsory school
attendance law, as applied, violated their right to the free exercise
of religion guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments to
the federal constitution. 145  Additionally, the defendants argued
that the compulsory school attendance law abridged their
fundamental right as parents to control the upbringing and
education of their children. 146
To resolve the conflict between the state's interest in the field
of education and the defendants' interest protected by the free
exercise clause, the court fashioned a three-pronged balancing
140. 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980).
141. State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). Section 15-34.1-01, the compulsory school
attendance law, provides as follows:
Every parent, guardian, or other person who resides within any schbol district, or who
resides upon any government base or installation without any school district, and has
control over any educable child of an age of seven years to sixteen years who does not
fall under the provisions of sections 15-34.1-02 or 15-34.1-03, shall send or take such
child to a public school each year during the entire time such school is in session.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 15-34.1-01 (1971).
The exception at issue in State v. Shaver provides in pertinent part the following:
The parent, guardian, or other person having control of a child required to attend
school by the provisions of this chapter shall be excused by the school board from
causing the child to attend school whenever it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the
board, subject to appeal as provided by law, that one of the following reasons exists:
1. That the child is in attendance for the same length of time at a parochial or
private school approved by the county superintendent of schools and the
superintendent of public instruction. No such school shall be approved unless
the teachers therein are legally certified in the state of North Dakota in
accordance with section 15-41-25 and chapter 15-36, the subjects offered are in
accordance with sections 15-38-07, 15-41-24, and such school is in compliance
with all municipal and state health, fire and safety laws.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 15-34.1-03 (1) (Interim Supp. 1979).
142. 294 N.W.2d at 885-87.
143. Id. at 887.
144. Id. at 886-87.
145. Id. at 888.
146. Id. at 899.
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test. 147 Relying heavily upon the United States Supreme Court's
analysis -in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 148 and the compelling state interest
test articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 149 the North Dakota Supreme
Court formulated a free exercise test focusing on (1) the nature of
the parties' belief, (2) whether the parties' free exercise of religion
had been burdened by the state regulation, and the degree of
impact on their religious beliefs, and (3) whether the state had a
compelling interest in the regulation, which justified the burden on
the free exercise of religion. 150
In Shaver, the State conceded that the conduct of the
defendants was motivated by bona fide religious beliefs. 15 1 Thus,
the court had no occasion to address the first prong of the
inquiry. 5 2 For the sake of argument, the court assumed that the
requirement that the school seek state approval imposed a burden
on the defendants' free exercise of religion. 153 The court ultimately
disposed of the free exercise argument finding that "[t]he
incidental burden on the free exercise of the parents' religion as a
result of the state approval requirement is justified under the
circumstances by the state's compelling interest in the
regulation. '15 Additionally, the court in Shaver held that the
compulsory school attendance law, as applied, did not violate the
defendants' right to control the upbringing and education of their
children, 155 because "they have not shown how the legitimate and
compelling interest of the state in educating its people has been
unreasonably pursued." 1 56
Although indicating that the least restrictive or "less drastic"
means analysis was inherent in the compelling state interest prong
of its free exercise test,5 7 the court was unable to determine, based
on the record, whether the use of a standardized achievement
testing program would provide the state with any assurance that the
children in the Bible Baptist School were receiving a sound
education. 158 The critical factor in the court's affirmance of the
compulsory school attendance law was the state's need for
assurance that its children are being educated and are in fact
147. Id. at 890-91.
148. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
149. 294 N.W.2d at 889-91. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
150. 294 N.W.2d at 891.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 895.
154. Id. at 897.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 899.
157. Id. at 895.
158. Id. at 897.
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attending school. The court stated that it was the approval
requirement that provided this assurance for the state. 159
While the court in Shaver intimated no view on whether the
compulsory school attendance law could constitutionally be applied
to situations in which a religious belief prevented compliance with,
for example, the teacher certification requirement, it did firmly
establish the test under which such questions will be decided.
Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota Employment Security Bureau
The supreme court in Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota
Employment Security Bureau, 160 held that the Grace Lutheran School
was not required to pay unemployment compensation taxes.'16 The
court concluded that although an exemption for elementary and
secondary schools had been repealed in both federal and state
statutes, the exemption for churches and organizations operating
primarily for religious purposes applied, at least where the school
was not separately incorporated and the teachers' employment
contracts were directly with the church. 162
Although the decision in Grace Lutheran Church was based on
principles of statutory construction, the court found that the
imposition of unemployment taxes on church schools would raise
serious first amendment problems. 163 The court, in analyzing these
first amendment questions under the establishment clause, applied
a three-pronged test. 164 The test requires that (1) the statute have a
secular legislative purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) the statute not
foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 165
The first two factors of the test presented no problem. 166 The court,
however, found that state monitoring and enforcement of the
unemployment compensation program could raise "serious
questions as to excessive governmental entanglement with
religion." 67 To avoid potential constitutional problems, the court
interpreted the statute to exempt the church school from payment
of the unemployment compensation tax. 168
159. Id.
160. 294 N.W.2d 767 (N.D. 1980).
161. Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota Employment Security Bureau, 794 N.W.2d 767,
771-72 (N.D. 1980).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 772-74.
164. Id. at 773-74. The court followed the three-pronged test articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
165. 294 N.W.2d at 773.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 773-74.
168. Id. at 774. It would appear that the religion clause implicated by the assessment of
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Hust v. Northern Log, Inc.
The court in Hust v. Northern Log, Inc., 169 affirmed the district
court's dismissal of an action against a foreign corporation because
of lack of personal jurisdiction. 70 The Husts had entered into a
contract with the defendant, a Minnesota corporation, to purchase
logs for the construction of a log home.17' Northern Log provided
on-site construction aid in North Dakota and shipped replacement
logs into North Dakota. 17  Large cracks developed in the
replacement logs, allowing water to leak into the Hust's home. 73
The Husts sued, alleging, among other things, breach of implied
and express warranties. 174 The Husts contended that North Dakota
had personal jurisdiction over Northern Log under the long arm
statute, by virtue of Northern Log's breach of warranties, tortious
conduct, and service supplied under a contract entered into in
North Dakota. 175
The court examined the transaction and concluded that
Northern Log had insufficient contacts with North Dakota to
permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 176 The court reasoned
that the defendant's replacement logs could not be used to support
a finding of the minimum contacts required by due process,
because to do so "would be tantamount to penalizing the
nonresident party for attempting to settle a dispute."1 77
Additionally, the court relied on a recent United States Supreme
Court decision to bolster its conclusion that Northern Log's
contacts with North Dakota did not satisfy due process
requirements for asserting personal jurisdiction. 178 The court also
unemployment compensation taxes against a church is the free exercise clause, not the establishment
clause. The danger inherent in such a law is not that it will foster a state religion, but that it will
infringe upon or burden the free exercise of religion. While the entanglement factor of the
establishment test relates to values similar to those at issue in a free exercise context, it is a distinct
element of a separate test. The free exercise clause would seem to be the proper analysis in Grace
Lutheran Church.
169. 297 N.W.2d 429 (N.D. 1980).
170. Hust v. Northern Log, Inc.,,297 N.W.2d 429, 433 (N.D. 1980).
171. Id at 430.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 431.
176. Id. at 433.
177. Id. at 432 (citing Lumber Mart, Inc. v. Haas Int'l Sales & Serv., 269 N.W.2d 83 (N.D.
1978)). The court, however, failed to point out that the cause of action arose out of defects in the
replacement logs, thus, arguably making Lumber Mart inapposite.
178. 297 N.W.2d at 432-33 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980) (car purchased in New York was in an accident in Oklahoma on the way to Arizona)). The
following facts were critical in the court's conclusion that the requisite minimum contacts were not
present: Northern Log closed no sales in North Dakota; Northern Log solicited no business in North
Dakota through salespersons or advertising reasonably calculated to reach the state; and Northern
Log did not directly serve the North Dakota market. In the words of the court, Northern Log's
contacts with North Dakota were similar to the "fortuitous circumstances" of World-Wide
Volkswagen.
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noted that the mere foreseeability that the defendant's product
might find its way into North Dakota did not justify the assertion of
personal jurisdiction. 179
The supreme court's decision in Hust suggests a restrictive
application of the minimum contacts requirement for the assertion
of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants under the due
process test embodied in North Dakota's long arm statute.
State v. Carpenter
In State v. Carpenter, 180 the court declared section 6-08-16.2 of
the North Dakota Century Code,18 the felony check statute,
unconstitutional as violative of equal protection. 182 The defendant
in Carpenter had been convicted of a misdemeanor for issuing checks
without sufficient funds. 183 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the statute, by providing an affirmative defense to
individual drawers who pay the holder of the check within thirty
days of notice of nonpayment, created an impermissible
classifcation based on wealth, which had the effect of discriminating
against indigents. 184
The court found that the affirmative defense for those drawers
who pay the holder within the prescribed time constituted class
legislation "because it imposes criminal prosecution burdens upon
179. Id. at 433.
180. 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980).
181. Section 6-08-16.2 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in relevant part as follows:
2. Any person who, for himself or as agent or representative of another,
issues any check, draft, or order for the payment of money is guilty of a class C
felony if:
a. At the time of issuing the instrument, the drawer does not have
an account with the bank or depository on which the instrument is
drawn; or
b. At the time of issuing the instrument, or at the time of
presentation for payment if made within one week after the original
delivery of the instrument, the drawer does not have sufficient funds in
the bank or depository, or credit with the bank, banker, or depository,
to pay the instrument in full upon its presentation; and
c. If the drawer has been previously convicted of issuing an
instrument without an account or without sufficient funds in a bank or
depository pursuant to sections 6-08-16.
3. The fact that payment has been refused by a drawee because of
insufficient funds or because the drawer has no account with the drawee from
which payment could legally be made shall constitute prima facie evidence of
intent to defraud. However, if the drawer pays the holder of the instrument
within thirty days after receiving written notice of nonpayment by certified
mail or by personal service in accordance with rule 4(d) of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure, that fact shall constitute an affirmative defense to a
criminal prosecution under this section.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-16.2 (Supp. 1979).
182. State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 109-10 (N.D. 1980).
183. Id. at 107.
184. Id. at 110. The court also noted, in dictum, that the absence of a mental culpability
requirement cast doubt on the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 110-11.
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some persons, i.e., indigents, which are not imposed upon
others." 18 5  The court further noted that while wealth
discrimination has not been declared to be a suspect classification
by the United States Supreme Court, "the Court has not ruled out
the possibility that wealth discrimination may be a suspect
classification."186 After concluding that the classification called for
a "standard of review greater than the rational
relationship-'rational basis'-standard," the court applied the
equal protection standard used to review gender-based
classifications under the federal constitution.187 According to the
court, the wealth classification at issue in Carpenter was "invalid
unless it serve[d] an important state interest" and was
"substantially related to that interest.'" '8 8 While finding the state
interest in preventing the issuance of nonsufficient funds checks to
be important, the court held that the classification based on wealth
was not substantially related to that interest, and was therefore
unconstitutional. 189
It is unclear from the Carpenter decision whether the court's
equal protection analysis was based on the federal constitutional
provision exclusively, or on both the federal and state constitutions.
Carpenter suggests that the court is solicitous of classifications based
on wealth, at least in the criminal law context. 190 Assuming that the
court's equal protection analysis is based on the state as well as the
federal constitution, Carpenter may suggest that the intermediate
standard of review adopted by the court under the state equal
protection provision' 9' is that used for gender-based classifications
under the federal constitution.
KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe
In KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 192 the court faced the issue of
185. Id. at 109.
186. Id. But see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973)
(Court refused to find that poor people constituted a suspect classification).
187 301 N.W.2d at 110.
188 Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The court cited the fact that a felony conviction can result from a defendant's inability
to pay a check as a reason for requiring a heightened standard of review. As the court noted, "[W]e
believe that the combination of the classification based upon wealth and the vital interests of
Carpenter at stake in a criminal prosecution require an intermediate standard of review." Id. Thus,
wealth discrimination, standing alone, may not receive such heightened scrutiny.
191. The supreme court has interpreted sections 11, 13, and 20 of the North Dakota
Constitution, the state equal protection provisions, to permit an intermediate standard of review
called the close correspondence test. See Law v. Maercklein, 292 N.W.2d 86, 91 (N.D. 1980);
Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 99 (N.D. 1979);
Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1979); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133
(N.D. 1978); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 774-77 (N.D. 1974). Seealso N.D. CONST. % 11,
13 & 20.
192. 298 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1980).
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public access to state's attorneys' inquiries.193 The court held that
state's attorneys' inquiries must be open to the public under section
22 of the North Dakota Constitution ' 94 and section 27-01-02 of the
North Dakota Century Code. 195 In Rothe, the state's attorney had
been permanently enjoined from barring the general public,
including the media, from access to state's attorneys' inquiries
conducted pursuant to section 11-16-15 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 196 The statute itself is silent on the subject of public
access. 197
Section 22 of the state constitution requires that "[a]ll courts
shall be open. . "198 In concluding that section 22 required state's
attorneys' inquiries to be open, the court determined that state's
attorneys were quasi-judicial officers, 199 and state's attorneys'
inquiries involved actions which were quasi-judicial in nature. 20 0
The court reasoned from this that the "all courts shall be open"
provision of the state constitution encompassed such inquiries. 20 1
In holding that provision to require public access to state's
attorneys' inquiries, the court interpreted the "all courts shall be
open" provision to confer a right of public access, 20 2 in addition to
granting litigants a right of free access to the courts. 203  By using
section 22 rather than the public trial right embodied in section 13
of the state constitution, the court may have significantly expanded
the kinds of proceedings the public may claim a right to attend. The
193. KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D. 1980).
194. Id. at 510-11. Section 22 of the North Dakota Constitution provides as follows:
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in
such manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by
law, direct.
N.D. CONST. ART. I, S 22.
195. 298 N.W.2d at 512. Section 27-01-02 of the North Dakota Century Code provides as
follows:
The sittings of every court of this state shall be public, and every citizen may
freely attend the same, except that on the trial of cases of a scandalous or obscene
nature the presiding judge or justice, in his discretion, may exclude therefrom all
persons not necessarily present as parties or witnesses.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-02 (1974).
196. 298 N.W.2d at 507. Additionally, the district court ruled that the state's attorney had no
affirmative obligation to post notice of pending proceedings. The district court based its decision that
state's attorneys' inquiries were open to the public primarily on an Attorney General's opinion,
which reasoned that a state's attorney's inquiry was, in effect, part of the coroner's proceedings,
which are required to be open. Id. at 507-09.
197. A state's attorney's inquiry may be held to investigate a criminal act causing a death or a
felony. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-16-15 (Supp. 1979).
198. See supra note 194.
199. 298 N.W.2d at 510.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 510-11.
202. Id. at 511.
203. Id. at 510.
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proceedings within the ambit of section 22 include more than the
actual trial. 204 The court in Rothe, however, was careful to point out
that section 22 does not guarantee an absolute right of access to
judicial proceedings. 205
Curiously, the court noted that its decision to open the state's
attorneys' inquiries was based in part on "the absence of legislation
which requires that the inquiry be closed to the public. "206 The
court, however, did not explain how the legislature could mandate
closure in the face of the constitutional requirement that "all courts
shall be open." Additionally, because the court held that the open
meeting laws were inapplicable to state's attorneys' inquiries, the
state's attorney is not required to notify the media or public of
pending state's attorneys' inquiries. 207
The impact of Rothe on public access to other kinds of judicial
and quasi-judicial proceedings is unclear given the court's
qualification of the right and the court's reference to numerous
proceedings to which the right presumably would not apply.20 8
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
MIRANDA
State v. Fields
State v. Fields20 9 was perhaps the court's most significant
decision of the year in the area of criminal procedure. In Fields, the
court held that the "custody" test, not the "focus" test, governs a
determination of whether Miranda warnings are required. 210
Additionally, the court held that Miranda is applicable to custodial
interrogation after an arrest for driving while intoxicated. 21
The defendant in Fields was taken to a hospital after having
been involved in a traffic accident. 212 While at the hospital, he was
asked by the local police chief whether he was the driver of the car
204. The court alluded to the public trial right embodied in section 13 of the North Dakota
Constitution, but pointed out that that section was inapplicable to Rothe "because the [state's
attorney's] inquiry cannot be equated to a trial." Id. at 513.
205. Id. at 512-13. Examples of permissible limitations cited by the Rothe court include the
following: Limitations on attendance; exclusion of individuals for creating disturbances; exclusion of
the public to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information and the identity of informants:
conferences in the judge's chambers or at the side bar; the exclusion of the public in trials of a
scandalous or obscene nature; juvenile proceedings; grand jury hearings; adoption proceedings; and
appellate court conferences. Id.
206. Id. at 514.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 513-14.
209. 294. N.W.2d 404(N.D. 1980).
210. State v.Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404, 408 (N.D. 1980).
211. Id. at 409-10.
212. Id. at 405.
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at the time of the accident. 21 3 Fields answered "yes," agreed to
submit to a blood-alcohol test, and was placed under arrest for
driving while under the influence of alcohol. 214  He was
subsequently questioned at the hospital by a deputy sheriff without
the benefit of Miranda warnings.21 5 The blood test and the
statements made to the police officer and the deputy sheriff were
suppressed prior to trial.216
In concluding that the defendant's response to the police
officer's initial question as to whether he was the driver of the car
should not have been suppressed, the court stated: "Mere
investigatory focus does not require the giving of Miranda
warnings. ' 217 The court held that, despite language in State v.
Iverson2t8 suggesting that North Dakota had adopted a "focus" test
for determining whether Miranda warnings are required, recent
North Dakota cases219 indicated that "custody" was the proper test
for triggering the requirements of Miranda.220 Applying the
"custody" test, the court concluded that the defendant's response
to the officer's question of whether he was the driver of the car was
not the result of custodial interrogation and was, therefore,
improperly suppressed. 221
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. After the defendant's arrest, he was informed of some, but not all, of his Miranda rights.
Id. Because Fields had not been fully advised, the court did not decide whether the warnings would
have been sufficient to allow the statements made in response to the subsequent questioning by the
deputy sheriff. Id. at 409 n. 4.
216. Id. at 405.
217. Id. at 406.
218. 187 N.W.2d 1 (N.D, 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971). In Iverson, the court stated its
understanding of Miranda as follows: "Our reading of Miranda is not that every person questioned in
the process of a criminal investigation must be given the Miranda warnings, but rather that these
warnings must be given to any person who is suspected of having committed a crime, or upon whom
the investigation is focused." State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 14 (N.D. 1971), cer denied, 404 U.S.
956(1971).
219. The court in Fields referred to State v. Metzner, 244 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1976), and State v.
Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1977), in concluding that, in actuality, it had adopted a
"custody" test for determining whether Miranda was applicable to a given situation. 294 N.W.2d at
408. Additionally, the Fields court noted that United States Supreme Court decisions indicated that
custody was the proper test for determining whether Miranda warnings are required. Id. at 407.
220. 294 N.W.2d at 408.
221. Id. In concluding that the defendant was not in custody when asked whether he was the
driver of the car, the Fields court noted the following facts:
[Wlhen Officer Heinen asked Fields if he was driving the car at the time of the
accident, he was not in custody nor deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any
significant way. His detention at the hospital resulted from medical advice, not from
any action of the authorities. Officer Heinen contacted Fields at the hospital as part of
the accident investigation. He went to check the condition of the driver and, if
necessary, to have a blood-alcohol test conducted. Fields was not taken to the hospital
by the officer but by a friend. Officer Heinen's question was asked at the hospital in
the presence of this friend and a nurse on duty. In view of these facts, we conclude that
Field's answer was not the result of a custodial interrogation in a police-dominated
atmosphere.
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The court, however, upheld the suppression of the defendant's
statements which he made to the deputy sheriff after he was placed
under arrest.22 2 The court held that while perhaps not necessary for
"routine traffic offenses where a driver is detained no longer than is
necessary for the issuance of a citation,'' 223 Miranda warnings are
required "before questioning a person who is in custody or
deprived of his freedom by the authorities for a more serious offense
such as driving while intoxicated. "224
City of Wahpeton v. Skoog
In City of Wahpeton v. Skoog, 225 the court held that evidence
obtained as the result of field sobriety tests226 was admissible despite
the failure to give Miranda warnings prior to administering the
test. 227 Relying on Schmerber v. California, 228 the court reasoned that
compelling a person to exhibit his physical characteristics of
coordination did not fall* within the realm of communicative
evidence protected by the fifth amendment. 2 29 The court noted that
its holding was merely an affirmation of the principle it implicitly
had recognized in Borman v. Tschida.230
222. Id. at 409-10.
223. Id. at 409.
224. Id. at 409. The court, however, realized that requiring Miranda warnings before
questioning someone arrested for driving while intoxicated could create confusion with respect to the
individual's refusal to take a blood-alcohol test. To prevent possible confusion, the court suggested
that "the officer, if he gives the Miranda warnings prior to asking the person to take the test, should
inform the person that if he refuses to take the test, whether by silence or negative answer, his license
is subject to suspension. " Id. at 410.
225. 300 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1980).
226. The tests performed by the defendant were "walking heel-to-toe on a red line, putting his
finger to his nose, standing on one leg, and having his eyes observed after shining a flashlight in his
eyes." City of Wahpeton v. Skoog, 300 N.W.2d 243, 244 n. 3 (N.D. 1980).
227. Id. at 245.
228. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court discussed the scope of the fifth amendment as
follows:
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications,
whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also com-
munications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers....
On the other hand, both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no
protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or
measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to
assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The distinction which has
emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against
compelling "communications" or "testimony," but that compulsion which makes a
suspect or accused the source of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966) (citation and footnote omitted).
229. 300 N.W.2d at 245.
230. Id. 171 N.W.2d 757 (N.D. 1969) (intimating, in dictum, that the results of field sobriety
tests would be admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings). In Skoog, the court noted that the
cases cited in Bornan upheld the admissibility of the results of sobriety tests given prior to Miranda
warnings. 300 N.W.2d at 245.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
State v. Phelps
In State v. Phelps, 231 the court adopted the inevitable-discovery
theory "as a necessary corollary and exception to the fruit-of-the-
poisonous-tree doctrine and the exclusionary rule. "232
The evidence at issue in Phelps involved photographs of the
defendant taken while the defendant was unlawfully detained and
disrobed at the police station.2 33 The photographs revealed cuts and
scratches on the defendant's neck and left arm, 234 which, along with
his observance near the scene of a fire, linked him to the burglary
and arson with which he was charged. Defense counsel contended
that the photographs were inadmissible as a "fruit of the poisonous
tree. "235 While acknowledging that the police officers' conduct in
using physical force to remove the defendant's boots and clothing
was an improper search and seizure, 236 the court, applying the
inevitable-discovery theory, concluded that the evidence was
properly admitted. 2 37 The court noted that "the police officers were
at all times cognizant of the cuts and scratches on Phelps' hands,
left arm, and neck. "238 Further, they noted that the shirt Phelps
was wearing was torn in the area where the cuts on his arm were
located. 239
In embracing the inevitable-discovery theory as an exception
to the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, the court was careful to
limit application of the theory. 240 The court adopted the test
espoused by Professor LaFave in his treatise on the fourth
amendment entitled "Search and Seizure." ' 241 In order for the
inevitable-discovery theory to apply, the State must meet a two-
part test:
First, use of the doctrine is permitted only when the police
231. 297 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1980).
232. State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 774 (N.D. 1980).
233. Id. at 773-74. The State previously had appealed a trial court order suppressing evidence
seized from the defendant while in custody at the police station. Id. at 771. The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's order suppressing the clothing forcibly seized from the defendant. See State
v. Phelps, 286 N.W.2d 472, 475, 477-78 (N.D. 1979).
234. 297 N.W.2d at 772.
235. Id. at 773. The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine prohibits the use of evidence obtained
by exploitation of a fourth amendment illegality. Id. at 774.
236. Id. at 773, 775.
237. Id. at 775.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 774.
240. Id. at 775. The court pointed out that while the inevitable discovery theory has the
support of the majority of courts that have considered it, the theory is subject to criticism because its
use will defeat the purposes of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 774-75. The court also noted that, as yet,
the theory has not been adopted by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 774-75 n. 2.
241. Id. at 775.
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have not acted in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of
the evidence in question. Second, the State must prove
that the evidence would have been found without the
unlawful activity and must show how the discovery of the
evidence would have occurred. 
21 2
The court found that the first part of the test was satisfied because
the police officers were aware at all times of the scratches on the
defendant.24 3 For the same reason, the court found that the second
element had also been satisfied.24 4 Thus, the court concluded that
the photographs were properly admitted into evidence. 245
It remains to be seen exactly how and to what extent the court
will invoke the inevitable-discovery theory to uphold the admission
of illegally obtained evidence. While the facts of Phelps were
particularly conducive to application of the theory, the court, by
adopting the two-part test espoused by LaFave, suggests that the
State will have a difficult burden to sustain the admissibility of
evidence under the theory . 24 6
State v. Swenningson
While breaking no new fourth amendment ground, the court
in State v. Swenningson24 7 applied for the first time the third party
consent exception to the search warrant requirements.
The defendant in Swenningson was nineteen years old,
emancipated, and had lived away from home for a period of
time. 24 18 He had asked his father for permission to return home and
was told that he could return home any time. 24 9 He thus resumed
living at home with his father and sister. 250 He made an informal
agreement to pay rent, but the only rent he paid was after his
arrest. 251
242. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH ANO SEIZURE § 11.4 (1978)).
243. 297 N.W.2d at 775. The court found as follows:
The first requirement does not prohibit use of the inevitable-discovery theory in
all instances where the police action was unlawful; rather, the theory cannot be used
only in instances where it is clear that the police acted in bad faith in order to
accelerate the discovery of the evidence in question. We are concerned that the action
by the police officers in this case is not of the degree which would require us to prevent
application of the inevitable-discovery theory .
Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. To satisfy the second element, the State must show that the evidence would have been
discovered. The Phelps court was careful to point out that "[al showing that discovery might have
occurred is entirely inadequate." Id. (emphasis added).
247. 297 N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1980).
248. State v. Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d 405, 406 (N.D. 1980).
249. Id. at 406.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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The police had obtained information that the defendant and a
juvenile had committed a burglary, and were apprised that the
defendant was in possession of some of the stolen property.2 52 The
police went to the defendant's residence and sought permission to
search.253 Defendant's sister informed them that she could not give
permission to search the house. 214 The police then contacted
defendant's father who gave written permission to search. The
search produced silverware and jewelry identified as stolen. 255
Defendant was subsequently convicted. He appealed, alleging
error in the trial court's refusal to suppress the evidence obtained in
the third party consent search.2 56
In affirming the trial court's denial of the suppression motion,
the court relied on United States v. Matlock,257 which established the
third party consent doctrine. According to Matlock, third party
consent to search is valid if the third party "possessed common
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or
effects sought to be inspected. "258 According to the Swenningson
court, a valid third party consent2 59 is based on the fact that the
individuals sharing the property assume the risk that one of their
co-occupants will consent to a search. 260 The court implicitly
rejected the notion that a valid third party consent to search was
based on a diminished expection of privacy. 261
Applying the Matlock test, the court in Swenningson determined
that because the father had the right to enter his son's bedroom,
because his sister could go in and out of his room, and because
there was no lock on the defendant's bedroom door, the father's
permission to search was valid. 262 Thus, the court has indicated
that third party consent searches will be deemed valid unless the
252. Id. at 405.
253. Id. at 405-06.
254. Id. at 406.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 405.
257. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
258. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (footnote omitted).
259. Id. at 171 n. 7.
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property
interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third party
consent does not rest upon the law of property... but rests rather on mutual use of the
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that
it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit the common area to be searched.
Id. (citations omitted).
260. 297 N.W.2d at 407.
261. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the authority of a third party to consent does not
extend to property in the exclusive control of the subject of the search. Id. at 408.
262. Id.
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subject of the search can provide evidence of exclusive control over
the premises or effects searched.
State v. Klodt
In a related context, the court has hinted that it may not follow
recent United States Supreme Court decisions imposing rigid
standing requirements for fourth amendment purposes.
Specifically, the court in State v. Klodt26s intimated that it would use
the state constitution 264 as an independent ground to reject the
United States Supreme Court decisions of Rakas v. Illinois,265 and
United States v. Salvucci. 266 The court in State v. Matthews2 67 had
indicated earlier that it might interpret the state constitution to
provide more liberal standing requirements for purposes of
challenging searches and seizures. 268 The court additionally noted
that the standing requirements established in Matthews and State v.
Fischer26 9 were premised in part on Jones v. United States, 270 which
had been overruled by Rakas and Salvucci. 271
The Klodt case arose after the defendant was convicted of theft
of property, which was found in the back of his abandoned pickup.
The court in Klodt concluded that whether it looked at defendant's
ownership of the pickup or at his expectation of privacy in the
pickup, the defendant had standing to challenge the validity of the
search of the pickup. 27 2 Thus, the court found it unnecessary to
decide whether it would adhere to its previous decisions or follow
Rakas and Salvucci. 273
PRESUMPTIONS
State v. Chyle
The court recently had occasion to deal with constitutional
263. 298 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1980).
264. State v. Klodt, 298 NW.2d 783, 786 (N.D. 1980).
265. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas v. Illinois, the Court abandoned the separate standing
inquiry for the fourth amendment and, instead, focused on whether the individual's substantive
fourth amendment rights were violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-40 (1978).
Additionally, the Court rejected the "legitimately on the premises" test to determine standing
developed in Jones v. United States. 439 U.S. at 142. See alsojones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
267 (1960).
266. 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (invalidating the automatic standing rule).
267. 216 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1974).
268. State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90, 99 (N.D. 1974).
269. 270 N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1978).
270. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
271. 298 N.W.2d at 786.
272. Id. The court upheld the seizure of stolen property because it fell within the plain view
doctrine. Id. at 786-88.
273. Id. at 786.
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challenges to presumptions contained in jury instructions. In State
v. Chyle, 274 the court held that on the facts of that case a jury
instruction which contained a presumption on the issue of intent
did not violate due process. 275 The instruction at issue in Chyle was
North Dakota Jury Instruction 1313, which provides in part that
"[i]t is presumed, however, that an unlawful act was done with
unlawful intent. ' 27 6 This instruction had been given along with
other instructions on culpability in the defendant's prosecution for
criminal mischief. 277
On appeal, the defendant argued that the North Dakota jury
instruction was essentially the same as one found unconstitutional
by the United States Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana.278 In
Sandstrom, the Court held that when intent is an element of the
crime, the jury instruction, "the law presumes that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," ' 279
violates the due process requirement that the state prove every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 280 Although
acknowledging that North Dakota Jury Instruction 1313 may be
invalid under Sandstrom when intent is an element of the offense, 281
the court held that use of the instruction in Chyle was not error,
because the culpability requirement for criminal mischief, the
offense with which the defendant was charged and convicted, was
recklessness. Thus, according to the Chyle court, the instruction was
mere surplusage. 28 2
State v. Sheldon
The constitutionality of the same jury instruction was again at
issue in State v. Sheldon.28 3 In Sheldon, the defendant was charged
274. 297 N.W.2d 409 (N.D. 1980).
275. State v. Chyle, 297 N.W.2d 409, 416-17 (N.D. 1980).
276. Id. at 416 n. 9. The entire instruction reads as follows:
The intent or purpose with which an act is done is a mental process and as such
generally remains hidden in the mind where it is conceived, and is rarely, if ever,
susceptible of proof by direct evidence. Intent may be inferred from the outward
manifestations, by the words or acts of the party entertaining it, and the facts and
circumstances surrounding or attending upon the acts sought to be proved, with which
it is charged to be connected. It is presumed, however, that an unlawful act was done
with an unlawful intent.
N.D. JURYINST. §1313.
277. 297 N.W.2d at 412.
278. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
279. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512 (1979).
280. Id. at 529. "Because . . . [the] jury may have interpreted the judge's instruction as
constituting either a burden-shifting presumption ...or a conclusive presumption ...and because
either interpretation would have deprived defendant of his right to the due process of law, we hold
the instruction given in this case unconstitutional. " Id. (citations omitted).
281. 297 N.W.2d at 416 n. 12.
282. Id. at 416-17.
283. 301 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1980).
285
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with attempted murder, an offense with a culpability requirement
of intent. 284 The defendant, however, was ultimately convicted of
reckless endangerment, even though the case was submitted to the
jury on the charge of attempted murder. 285 The Sheldon court,
although concluding that the jury instruction was impermissible
under Sandstrom, nevertheless held that its use in this case
constituted harmless error because the defendant was ultimately
convicted for an offense with a culpability requirement of
recklessness. 28 6 Thus, it would appear that use of North Dakota
Jury Instruction 1313 is improper when intent is the culpability
requirement of the offense for which the defendant is convicted.
FAMILY LAW
Mansukhani v. Pailing
In Mansukhani v. Pailing, 287 a mother brought habeas corpus
proceedings to obtain custody of her children after her ex-
husband's death. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that
present procedures for writs of habeas corpus are not appropriate
for determining the custody of a child based upon changed
circumstances. 28 8 The court noted that the writ has been employed
in North Dakota since 1913 in child custody matters. 28 9 It stated,
however, that the better procedure would be to initiate an action by
using a complaint, a petition, or an application stating the facts, the
nature of the matter, and the remedial relief sought. 290 The court
stated that another proper procedure would be by a motion,
requesting an evidentiary hearing whenever the evidence is in
dispute and the parties are the same as those in the divorce
decree. 291
Bergstrom v. Bergstrom
A unique custody dispute confronted the court in Bergstrom v.
Bergstrom.292 A split custody arrangement was originally provided
for between the parties. Following the separation, the mother
moved to Norway with the child. The father then filed an action to
284. State v. Sheldon, 301 N.W.2d 604, 607 (N.D. 1980).
285. Id. at 613.
286. Id.
287. 300 N.W.2d 847 (N.D. 1980).
288. Mansukhani v. Pailing, 300 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D. 1980). The court noted that the writ
of habeas corpus is probably more pertinent in "child snatching" cases than in other cases due to the
nature of the issue involved which comes close to liberating an "imprisoned" child. Id. at 850 n. 2.
289. Id. at 850. See Knapp v. Tolan, 26 N.D. 23, 142 N.W. 915(1913).
290. 300 N.W.2d at 850.
291. Id.
292. 296 N.W.2d 490 (N.D. 1980).
286
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have the custody decree modified from split custody to total custody
with him. 293 The district court held that it was in the child's best
interests that the mother have total custody, with limited,
supervised visitation rights for the father, and with no restriction on
the mother's right to choose the child's place of residence, including
a residence outside the United States. 294
On appeal, the supreme court reversed and reinstated the
prior split custody arrangement, conditioned upon the mother's
maintaining a residence in the United States. 295 The court noted
that the child had expressed a preference for living in the United
States. This preference was a significant factor, according to the
court, in determining the child's best interests as to her residence,
in light of the fact that the child was of above average intelligence
and had had an opportunity to compare life in several foreign
countries. 296 The court did not determine whether the child had a
constitutional right to remain in the United States, 297 but in dicta,
the court acknowledged that such a right might exist.
298
Beck v. Smith
In Beck v. Smith, 299 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
the notice requirements of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act are applicable to enforcement of a foreign custody
decree under the Uniform Child CustodyJurisdiction Act. 30 0
Petitioner Beck requested the court to issue a writ of
prohibition against the district court to set aside its ex parte order
requiring her to return custody of her children to their father
pursuant to a Maryland custody decree. 30 1 The court determined
that the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
encompasses enforcement of all foreign judgments, including
foreign custody decrees. 30 2 Because enforcement of the Maryland
293. Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 296 N.W.2d 490, 492 (N.D. 1980).
294. Id. at 493.
295. Id. at 495.
296. Id. at 496.
297. Id. at 497.
298. Id. at 495-96.
299. 296 N.W.2d 886 (N.D. 1980).
300. Beck v. Smith, 296 N.W.2d 886, 891 (N.D. 1980).
301. Id. at 888.
302. Id. at 891-92. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-14 (1971 & Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE ch.
28-20.1 (1974).
Section 28-20.1-01 defines a "foreign judgment" as "any judgment, decree, or order of a court
of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state." N.D,
CENT. CODE S 28-20.1-01 (1974) (Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act).
Section 28-20.1-03 provides in relevant part as follows:
(2) Promptly upon thefiling of aforeign judgment and the affidavit, the clerk shall mail notice
of the filing of theforeignjudgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall make a
note of the mailing in the docket. The notice shall include the name and post-office
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decree in this case was not accomplished in compliance with the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, the court
continued a temporary stay of the ex parte order until petitioner
was given notice of the filing of the Maryland decree in North
Dakota, and a period of ten days had elapsed from the time of the
notice . 30 3
Justice Vande Walle dissented in part, pointing out that under
the majority opinion, a noncustodial parent can ignore a foreign
custody decree and retain the child beyond the time permitted if the
parent having permanent custody does not file the decree and give
notice of the filing. 3
0 4
Lucke v. Lucke
In Lucke v. Lucke, 30 5 a case arising under the Adult Abuse Act, 30 6 the
court held that section 14-07.1-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code 307 encompasses harm to members of the complaining adult's
family caused by abusive behavior against the adult. 308
Significantly, the court expanded the definition of abuse under this
section to include mental as well as physical harm. 30 9 The court
further held that a protective order under the Adult Abuse Act can
be issued even though the beneficiary of the order objects to its
issuance, provided the applicant for the order is a spouse or a
family member. 310
address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor's lawyer, if any, in this
state. In addition, the judgment creditor may mail a notice of the filing of the
judgment to the judgment debtor and may file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of
mailing notice of filing by the clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if
proof of mailing by thejudgment creditor has been filed.
(3) No execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign judgment filed hereunder shall
issue until ten days qfter the date of thejudgment is filed.
N. D. CENT. CODE § 28-20.1-03 (1974) (emphasis added).
303. 296 N.W.2d at 893. The court stated that a foreign custody decree could be enforced by an
ex parte order provided the enforcement was accomplished in compliance with the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign.Judgments Act, and that such enforcement did not require a determination
of the court's jurisdiction, notice and hearing, or a custody determination. The court overruled
Giddings v. Giddings, 228 N.W.2d 915 (N.D. 1975). to the extent it represented a tontrarv vicw. Id. at
892.
304. Id. at 894. (Vande Walle,J., dissenting).
305. 300 N.W.2d 231 (N.D. 1980).
306. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-07.1 (Supp. 1979).
307. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (Supp. 1979). Section 14-07.1-01 provides that "ff]or
purposes of this Chapter, 'adult abuse' includes physical harm, bodily injury, or assault on the
complaining adult, or the imminent threat thereof." Id.
308. Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 234 (N.D. 1980).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 235. Seealso N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (1) (Supp. 1979). Section 14-07.1-02 (1)
provides that "[ajn action for a protection order commenced by a verified application alleging the
existence of adult abuse may be brought by any spouse or family member in the district court, regardless
of whether or not a petition for legal separation, annulment, or divorce has been filed." Id.
(emphasis added).
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GOVERNMENT
Litten v. City of Fargo
Litten v. City of Fargo311 involved the question of under what
circumstances a home rule city may alter its form of government.
The controversy arose in Fargo, a home rule city, when petitions
which called for a change from the commission system to the
council form of government were circulated. 312 The district court
issued an injunction which prevented any election that could have
implemented the change, and appeal was taken to the North
Dakota Supreme Court. 313
The supreme court initially stated that whatever powers a
home rule city possesses are the result of a grant by the state in the
form of statutory provisions. 314 The statutes pertaining to the
powers of home rule cities are found in sections 40-05.1-05 and 40-
05.1-06.of the North Dakota Century Code. 315 Section 40-05.1-06
lists the powers that a home rule city may possess, and section 40-
05.1-05 provides that such powers may supersede state law if
certain conditions are met. 31 6 The court held that in order for these
powers to supersede state law, they must be specified in the city
charter and implemented by city ordinance. 31 7
The court also examined whether a provision for changing the
form of government existed either in Fargo's city charter or the city
ordinance. 318 The court found such a provision in the former 319 but
not the latter. 320 The court concluded that, because there was no
provision in the ordinance relating to changing the form of
government, Fargo could not avail itself of the powers listed in the
home rule statute, but was subject to those statutes generally
applicable to all cities. 321 If the citizens of Fargo wished to change
from a commission to a council form of government they would
have to do so under chapter 40-04 of the North Dakota Century
Code and not chapter 40-05.1.322
311. 294 N.W.2d 628 (N.D. 1980).
312. Litten v. City of Fargo, 294 N.W.2d 628, 630 (N.D. 1980).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 631. The statutes dealing with home rule cities are found in chapter 40-05.1 of the
North Dakota Century Code and are based on section 130 of the North Dakota Constitution, which
authorizes the legislature to grant powers to home rule cities by statute. Id. See also N.D. CENr. CODE
ch. 40-05.1 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CONST. art. 6, § 130.
316. 294 N.W.2d at 631.
317. Id. at 631-32.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 632-33.
320. Id. Article 12 of the Limited Home Rule Charter of the City of Fargo sets out the
requirements for changing the form of government. See FARGO, N.D., LIMITE HOME RULE ClHARTER
art. 12.
321. 294 N.W.2d at 633.
322. Id. at 632-33. The laws applying to all cities generally are found in title 40 of the North
289
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The court also noted that the new government plan proposed
in the Fargo petition lacked sufficient specificity and, thus, was
inconsistent with the legislative intent behind statutes providing for
a change of government for cities. 32 3 That intent was to ensure that
the citizens would be aware of the form the new government would
take. 324 The court concluded that to permit a vote on a change of
government before the specifics of that government were settled
"would be like asking the people to buy a pig in a poke. "325 Justice
Vande Walle specially concurred, agreeing that before a home rule
city may exercise certain powers, those powers must have been
granted to home rule cities by the state. 326
Besette v, Enderlin School District Number 22
On April 20, 1976, a six year old student fell off a slide and
broke her arm while playing.,on school property at Alice, North
Dakota. Her father filed an action for damages, individually and on
his daughter's behalf, against the school district on October 12,
1977. The school district moved for and received summary
judgment on the ground that the claim had not been filed within
ninety days of the injury as required by statute. The father
appealed this ruling to the North Dakota Supreme Court in Besette
v. Enderlin School District Number 22.327
The first issue presented was whether actual notice satisfies the
claim filing requirement of the statute. 328 The supreme court found
actual notice in the fact that several school district officials were
apprised of the girl's injury soon after it occurred. 329 The court
held, however, that actual notice was not enough to meet the
legitimate state interests embodied in the statute requiring a timely,
Dakota Century Code dealing with municipal government. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 40
(1968 and Supp. 1979).
323. 294 N.W.2d at 634.
324. Id
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. 288 N.W.2d 67 (N D. 1980).
328. Besette v. Enderlin School Dist. Number 22, 288 N.W.2d 67, 69 (N.D. 1980). The
applicable statute was subsection 1, section 4, chapter 295, 1975 North Dakota Session Laws, which
provided in part as follows:
Except as otherwise provided, any claim against a political subdivision for injuries
alleged to have arisen under the provisions of this Act shall be filed, within ninety days
after the alleged occurrence of such injury, in the office of the county auditor. Such
claim shall be signed and verified by the claimant and shall describe the time, place,
cause, and extent of the damage or injury, shall containd an abstract of the facts upon
which the claim is based, and shall specify the amount of damages claimed therefor.
N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 295, §4 (1) (1975). This statute offered only temporary protection and
terminated onJuly 1, 1977. It was replaced by Chapter 32-12.1 of the North Dakota Century Code
which contains no similar provisions. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-12.1 (Supp. 1979).
329. 288 N.W.2d at 68-71.
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signed, and verified claim. 330 The court reasoned that actual notice
was insufficient to inform the school district of its potential liability
so that it could investigate the incident while the facts were still
fresh. 331
The second issue addressed was whether the ninety day
requirement was mandatory or merely directory in effect. 332 The
court focused on the word "shall," giving it a mandatory
connotation in the statute. 333 According to the court, to find
otherwise would render the statute meaningless and would ignore
the legislature's expressed intent to provide temporary protection
subsequent to the abolition of governmental immunity. 334 Thus,
the court held that failure to file a claim within the ninety day limit
precluded the right to bring an action against a political entity.
335
The final issue raised was whether a minor must comply with
the ninety day claim filing requirement. 336 The court quoted
section 28-01-25 of the North Dakota Century Code337 and held
that a minor has ninety days after reaching majority in which to file
a claim. 338 Thus, the injured child in this case was permitted to
pursue her claim on her own behalf.
339
Justices Sand and Vande Walle specially concurred in the
result. Both concluded that actual notice satisfies the statutory
requirement and is sufficient to inform the governmental body of
the nature of the claim against it.340 Justice Pederson dissented,
arguing that all claims involving the injured child should be barred
by the ninety day limitation because section 28-01-25 as applied to
minors is of no effect in the face of legislative intent to protect
political subdivisions. 341
INDIANS
Malaterre v. Malaterre
In Malaterre v. Malaterre, 342 the court interpreted portions of the
330. Id. at 71.
331. Id.
332.Id. at 72.
333. Id.
334. Id. See Kitto v. Minot Park District, 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974) (abolished governmental
immunity).
335. 288 N.W.2d at 73.
336. Id. at 73.
337. Id. Section 28-01-25 provides ini part as follows: "If a person who is entitled to bring an
action . . . is: 1. Under the age ofeighteen years . . . at the time the cause of action accrues, the time
of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action ......
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-01-25 (1973).
338. 288 N.W.2d at 73-74.
339. Id. at 75.
340. Id. at 75-76.
341. Id. at 76-77.
342. 293 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1980).
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Indian Civil Rights Act. 343 The case involved a "motion to modify
the child custody provision of a divorce judgment. '34 The
appellant and appellee were both enrolled members of the Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa. 345 Appellee filed for divorce in
Rolette County district court.3 46 The divorce was granted and,
under the terms of the final judgment, appellee was given custody
of the couple's child. At the time the divorce was granted, neither
party resided within the boundaries of an Indian reservation.
Subsequent to that time, however, appellee moved several times
and, at the time appellant brought the motion to modify the child
custody provision, both appellee and the child resided "within the
exterior boundaries of the Turtle Mountain Reservation. ' 347
Based on this fact, the district court dismissed appellant's action
because of lack ofjurisdiction. 4 8
The issue before the supreme court was whether the district
court, in handling the original divorce proceeding, retained
jurisdiction over appellee and the child even though they currently
resided within an Indian reservation. 34 9 In addressing this issue,
the court first stated the general rule that a court which
has jurisdiction over a divorce proceeding retains that jurisdiction
with regard to child custody, education, and care.3 50 The court then
noted that, absent a collective action by the Indian tribe
involved, 351 section 203 of the North Dakota Constitution ,352 in
combination with sections 1322 and 1326 of title 25 of the United
States Code,35 3 precludes the exercise of state court jurisdiction
over Indian land within the boundaries of an Indian reservation. 354
The court further noted that, although chapter 27-19 of the North
Dakota Century Code355 provides for the assumption ofjurisdiction
over Indian reservations by the state, the Indian tribe involved has
not acted to confer that jurisdiction upon the state. 356 Thus, the
343. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1972).
344. Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 140 (N.D. 1980).
345. Id. at 141.
346. Id. at 140.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 142.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 143.
352. N.D. CONST. S 203 provides that Indian lands are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States Congress. It further provides that the state legislature may provide a means for the
acceptance ofjurisdiction in accordance with an Act of Congress. Id.
353. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1326 (1972). These sections provide for the assumption of civil
jurisdiction by a state only when a majority of the enrolled Indians within a reservation vote to allow
the state to amend juriscition. Id.
354. 293 N.W.2d at 142-43.
355. N.D. CENT. CoDE ch. 27-19(1974).
356. 293 N.W.2d at 143.
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court concluded that "North Dakota does not have jurisdiction
over Indians residing within the exterior boundaries of an Indian
reservation. '",57
INSURANCE
Aid Insurance Services, Inc. v. Geiger
In Aid Insurance Services, Inc. v. Geiger,358 the supreme court
affirmed the district court's order granting a summary judgment in
favor of an insured. The case involved a declaratory judgment
action brought by an insurer. The insurer sought to determine
whether a comprehensive general liability policy issued to a
construction firm provided coverage for a property damage award
obtained against the insured in an earlier lawsuit.
35 9
The insurance policy at issue contained an exclusion denying
coverage for property damage to work performed by the insured
arising out of that work or out of materials, parts, or equipment
furnished in connection with the work. 360 The policy also contained
a provision excluding coverage for liability assumed by the insured
under a contract or an agreement. 361 This provision, however,
357. Id. The court refused to apply the concept of "residuary jurisdiction" because to do so
would violate the standard of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). In Williams v. Lee, the United
States Supreme Court stated that "absent governing acts of Congress, the question [of whether a
state may exercise jurisdiction] has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 358 U.S. at 220. The North
Dakota court refused to apply the concept of "residuary jurisdiction" because Congress had enacted
sections 1322 and 1326 of title 26 of the United States Code which govern the assumption of
jurisdiction by a state. 293 N.W.2d at 143. The court also refused to apply the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act because the custodial parent and the child were not within a sister state as
required by the act, but rather were within an Indian reservation. 293 N.W.2d at 144. See also N.D.
CENT. CooE ch. 14-14 (1971) (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act). The court further found the
"full faith and credit clause" of Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution to be
inapplicable because it "is expressly applicable only between states [and] Indian reservations are not
states." 293 N.W.2d at 144. In drawing this conclusion, the court did not address section 1738 of
title 28 of the United States Code which provides as follows:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its territories and possessions as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1977). Additionally, the court rejected the concept of comity because the initial
court did not have jurisdiction, which is a necessary prerequisite to the adjudication of comity. 293
N.W.2d at 144-45. Finally, the court determined that the Indian Child Welfare Act "does not apply
to the award of custody of a child or children to one or the other parent as the result of a divorce
proceeding." 293 N.W.2d at 145. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (Supp. 1980) (Indian Child Welfare
Act).
358. 294 N.W.2d 411 (N.D. 1980).
359. Aid Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Geiger, 294 N.W.2d 411, 412 (N.D. 1980).
360. Id. at 413. The exclusion stated the following: "This insurance does not apply: (a) to
property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work or
any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith;" Id.
361. 294 N.W.2d at 413.
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stated that the exclusion did not apply "to a warranty of fitness or
quality of the named insured's products or a warranty that work
performed by or on behalf of the named insured will be done in a
workmanlike manner."362
The court in Geiger found the two provisions in'the policy to be
irreconcilable. 363 Because the two provisions, when read together,
were ambiguous, the court applied general rules of construction
and resolved the uncertainty by ruling in favor of the insured. 364
Smith v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
In Smith v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 365 the court
ruled that an insurer may be held liable in tort for a failure to
defend its insured. The case involved an action by the insured,
Smith, against American Family for breach of a contract of
automobile insurance, and for the tortious breach of the implied
covenant of fair dealing and good faith. 366
The controversy arose out of an incident in which Smith, the
chief of police at Pembina, North Dakota, used his vehicle as a
roadblock at the request of a deputy sheriff from Cavalier
County. 367 The Smith vehicle was subsequently struck by a van. A
passenger in that van, Herzog, later sued Smith for injuries
sustained as a result of the collision. 368 American Family initially
refused to defend Smith, claiming there was no coverage because
Smith had assumed liability for the collision. 369 Although American
Family later agreed to assume the defense, the company refused to
pay Smith for the full amount of the attorney's fees that had
accrued before the defense was assumed. 370 Thus, Smith proceeded
with the lawsuit against American Family.
In affirming the liability of American Family, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota relied on its earlier decision in Corwin
Chrysler Plymouth v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 37 1 in which the
court held that the refusal by an insurer to accept a reasonable
settlement could result in tort liability. 372 Significantly, the court
found no distinction between the insurer's failure to defend and the
362. Id.
363. Id. at 414.
364. Id. at 414-15.
365. 294 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1980).
366. Smith v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751, 755 (N.D. 1980).
367. Id. at 753.
368. Id- at 754.
369. Id. at 755. There was a provision in the policy excluding liability assumed by the insured
under any contract or agreement. Id.
370. Id.
371. 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979).
372. 294 N.W.2d at 756-61.
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failure to accept a settlement. 373 Furthermore, because American
Family was found to have breached its duty to act fairly and in good
faith, the court in Smith noted that recovery could not be limited to
the amount of the policy plus attorney's fees and costs. 374
American Family argued that under the rule of Whetham v.
Bismarck Hospital,375 Smith could not recover damages for
emotional distress unless he was in personal danger of physical'
impact. 376 The supreme court, however, held that the Whetham rule
was "not applicable to a tortious breach of an insurer's duty of
good faith and fair dealing.'37
American Family also challenged the $50,000 exemplary
damages award, claiming first that the testimony on the insured's
emotional condition caused the jury to speculate concerning the
damage award. 378 While the court acknowledged that the verdict
was an amount equal to the liability of Smith's insurance policy, it
found that the damages awarded Smith were for injuries he had
already suffered. 379 American Family also argued that the award
was excessive, but the court found the evidence sufficient to support
the damage award.380 Despite American Family's urging, the court
in Smith refused to adopt a requirement that punitive damages be
reasonably proportionate to the award of actual damages.381
Anderson v. American Standard Insurance Co.
The case of Anderson v. American Standard Insurance Co., 3 2 arose
out of the same incident as did the Smith case. Anderson, the driver
of the van that collided with Smith's vehicle, brought suit against
American Standard after the company had informed him that they
would not cover him because his policy had expired prior to the
accident. 383
The problem in Anderson began when the insurance agent
miscalculated the premium due because of a misunderstanding at
the time of Anderson's application for insurance. 384 After the error
was discovered, the company sent Anderson three notices
indicating there was a balance due. 8 5 The final notice indicated
373. Id. at 759.
374. Id. at 758.
375. 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
376. 294 N.W.2d at 761-62.
377. Id. at 762.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 766.
381. Id.
382. 293 N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 1980).
383. Anderson v. American Standard Ins. Co., 293 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D. 1980).
384. Id. at 880.
385. Id.
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that the policy expiration date was being changed to conform with
the premium actually paid, and that the policy would therefore
lapse on June 6, 1976, unless it was renewed pursuant to its
terms . 386
Anderson argued that under section 26-04-02 of the North
Dakota Century Code,3 8 7 American Family was estopped from
denying that it received full payment of the premium.38 8 The court,
however, held that the insurer was not estopped under section 26-
04-02 even though the policy was delivered to the insured with an
indication that the premium was paid in full. 38 9 In doing so, the
court interpreted section 26-04-02 contrary to the case of Sawyer v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty,390 in which the Supreme Court of
California interpreted an identical statute. 391 The court adopted the
reasoning of the dissent in Sawyer, and found that section 26-04-02
did not prohibit American Family from exercising its cancellation
rights contained in the policy. 392
The court in Anderson also found that American Family was
within its rights to modify the policy by changing the expiration
date to conform to the amount of premium actually paid.3 93 The
court concluded that such action was proper because Anderson had
been notified of the balance owing on the policy and because the
company had reserved broad cancellation rights under the
policy. 394 Furthermore, the court concluded that the facts in the
case indicated that the insured was aware of the problem and that
his silence in the face of the notices indicated acquiescence to the
386. Id.
387. Section 26-04-02 of the North Dakota Century Code provides as follows: "An
acknowledgement in a policy of the receipt of premium is conclusive evidence of its payment so far as
to make the policy binding notwithstanding any stipulation in the policy that it shall not be binding
until the premium actually is paid. " N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-04-02 (1978).
388. 293 N.W.2d at 881.
389. Id. at 882.
390.69 Cal. 2d 801, 447 P.2d 344, 73 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1968).
391. 293 N.W.2d at 881-82. Anderson argued that Sawyer supported his position that section 26-
04-02 applied to termination as well as comencement of the policy period. Id. at 881. The North
Dakota Supreme Court, however, took note of the fact that, following the Sawyer case, the California
legislature amended its provision of the California Insurance Code to read as follows:
Policy as receipt; cancellation An acknowledgment in a policy of the receipt of premium is
conclusive evidence of its payment, so far as to make the policy binding.
Notwithstanding such acknowledgment, a policy may be canceled effective at such
time as otherwise permitted by law for nonpayment of all or any portion of the
premium which is actually unpaid if such cancellation right is reserved to the insurer
in the policy.
Id. at 882 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 484 (West 1972)). Thus, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
adopted the reasoning in the dissenting opinion in Sawyer. Id. at 882 (McComb, J., dissenting).
392. 293 N.W.2d at 882.
393. Id. at 883.
394. Id.
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modification.39 5 Thus, the court in Anderson affirmed the district
court's ruling that the automobile insurance contract was not in
effect at the time of the accident.
3 96
JUVENILES
In Interest of K. G.
In In Interest of K. G., 397 the court addressed issues concerning
the constitutional and statutory requirements of waiver hearings in
juvenile courts. K.G., a juvenile, was charged with murder. The
state's attorney filed a Request for Transfer of Jurisdiction from
juvenile court to a court having criminal jurisdiction over the
offense. 398 After a waiver hearing was set by the juvenile court and
three days notice was given to the affected parties, K.G., his
parents, and his court-appointed attorney appeared at the hearing
and opposed the waiver. The juvenile court issued an order waiving
jurisdiction in the juvenile court, and K.G. appealed, alleging a
violation of his constitutional rights. 399
The supreme court held that the Uniform Juvenile Court Act
requires a due process hearing prior to the waiver of a juvenile into
an adult court for criminal prosecution. 40 0 The court also held that
"When a matter is disputed, the hearing requires that evidence
supporting reasonable grounds to believe that the child committed
395. Id. The court indicated that a single notice may not have been adequate, but concluded
that the three different notices from American Family were sufficient. Id.
396. Id. at 884.
397. 295 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1980).
398. Ex rel. K. G., 295 N.W.2d 323, 324 (N.D. 1980).
399. Id. at 324-25.
400. Id. at 326. N.D. CENT. CoDE ch. 27-20 (1974 & Supp. 1979). Transfer hearings are
governed by section 27-20-34 of the North Dakota Century Code which permits transfer to adult
court for prosecution if as follows:
1.a. The child is over seventeen or more years of age and requests the transfer;
or
b.(l) The child was sixteen or more years of age at the time of the alleged
conduct;
(2) A hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held in conformity
with sections 27-20-24, 27-20-26, and 27-20-27;
(3) Notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing is given
to the child and his parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three days
before the hearing; and
(4) The court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
(a) The child committed the delinquent act alleged;
(b) The child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile
through available facilities.
(c) The child is not treatable in an institution for the mentally retarded
or mentally ill; and
(d) The interests of the community require that the child be placed
under legal restraint or discipline.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 1979).
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the delinquent act must be produced by witnesses available for
cross-examination. "401
MINES AND MINERALS
West v. Alpar Resources, Inc.
In West v. Alpar Resources, Inc., 402 the court interpreted the
royalty clause of a gas lease. The case involved an appeal from a
partial summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims with
prejudice. 40 3 Plaintiffs, the Wests, were the successors in interest to
an oil and gas lease.4 0 4 Production had been obtained on the
leasehold, and the Wests were entitled to royalties. 405 The royalty
clause required the lessee, Alpar, to pay " 'as royalty, one-eighth of
the proceeds from the sale of the gas.' ",406 Prior to making
payment to the Wests, Alpar requested that they sign a division
order. The Wests refused to sign the division order tendered by
Alpar because they did not believe it accurately stated the amount
of royalty to which they were entitled. As a result, the Wests had
their attorney draw up a different division order, which Alpar
refused to sign.4 0 7 Because of the failure to reach agreement on the
division order, the Wests did not receive the royalty payments they
felt they were entitled to. 40 8
The issues before the court were as follows: 40 9 (1) Whether
Alpar was entitled to deduct a proportionate share of the expenses
from the royalty payment; (2) whether Alpar's failure to make any
royalty payments caused the lease to terminate by its own terms;
and (3) whether the lease could be cancelled pursuant to section 47-
16-39.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. 4 10
401. 295 N.W.2d at 326. SeealsoExrel. P.W.N., 301 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 1981) (hearsay reports
admissible at transfer hearings to establish reasonable grounds to believe that the child is not
amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available facilities, that the child is not
treatable in an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill, and that the interests of the
community require that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline); Ex reL B. L., 301
N.W.2d 387 (N.D. 1981) (court held that, under the 1977 amendments to the Uniform juvenile
Court Act, adult court, not juvenile court, has jurisdiction over juveniles who have been issued a
valid operator's license or permit and have been charged with D.W.I.).
402. 298 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 1980).
403. West v. Alpar Resources Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484, 485 (N.D. 1980).
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 486.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 487. Section 47-16-39.1 provides in part as follows:
The obligation arising under an oil and gas lease to pay oil or gas royalties to the
mineral owner or his assignee, or to deliver oil or gas to a purchaser to the credit of
such mineral owner or his assignee, or to pay the market value thereof is of the essence
298
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The court initially examined the numerous cases, treatises,
and articles cited by both parties. Using these authorities as
background, the court determined that the royalty clause was
ambiguous.4 11 Citing Gilmore v. Superior Oil Company412 and Ladd v.
Upham413 for the proposition that a lease should be construed
against its maker, the court concluded that the Wests were
"entitled to royalty payments based upon a percentage of the total
proceeds received by Alpar from the sale of the gas without
deduction for the cost of extracting hydrogen sulfide and without
deduction for any other cost incurred by Alpar. "414
The court next addressed the Wests' contention that the lease
had expired by its own terms because of Alpar's failure to pay the
royalties. The court concluded that the failure to make the royalty
payments might have been a breach of the lease, but it did not
terminate the lease. 41 5 Noting finally that the Wests had accepted
royalty payments from Alpar during the period in which the
amount of the royalty due was in dispute, the court upheld the
district court's refusal to apply section 47-16-39.1 of the North
Dakota Century Code. 41 6 Thus, the court refused to allow a
cancellation of the lease based upon equitable grounds. 41 7
Geo Resources, Inc. v. Tax Commissioner
In Geo Resources, Inc. v. Tax Commissioner, 418 the court discussed
the applicability of the North Dakota coal severance tax41 9 to
leonardite4 20 The case involved an appeal from a determination by
the tax commission that a coal severance tax was properly assessed
against Geo Resources, Inc. (Geo). 421 Geo was engaged in mining
leonardite. In 1976 the tax commission required Geo to file
quarterly coal severance tax reports and to pay coal severance taxes
on the leonardite it mined. 422 In response, Geo asserted that it had
in the lease contract, and breach of such obligation may constitute grounds for the
cancellation of such lease in such cases where it is determined by the court that the
equities of the case require cancellation....
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-16-39.1 (1978).
411. 298 N.W.2d at 490.
412. 192 Kan. 388, 388 P.2d 602 (1964).
413. 58 S.W.2d 1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), aff'd. 128 Tex. 14, 95 S.W.2d 365 (1936).
414. 298 N.W.2d at 491.
415. Id. at 492.
416. Id. N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-16-39.1 (1978). Seesupra note 410 for text of this statute.
417. 298 N.W.2d at 492.
418. 288 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1980).
419. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 57-61 (Supp. 1979).
420. Leonardite is oxidized lignite. Geo. Resources, Inc. v. Tax Comm'r, 288 N.W.2d 54, 55-
56 (N.D. 1980).
421. 288 N.W.2d at 54-55.
422. Id. at 54.
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not mined any coal. 42 3 Geo also responded that the data they
submitted on the amount of leonardite severed was for
informational purposes only.4 24 Based on this information, the tax
commission assessed a coal severance tax. 42
5
The issue addressed by the court was whether the leonardite
mined and marketed by Geo was subject to the coal severance tax
imposed by chapter 57-61 of the North Dakota Century Code. In
addressing this issue, the court determined that the conclusions of
the tax commissioner were supported by the findings of fact. 42 6 It
next found that the intent of the legislature in enacting chapter 57-
61 was to subject all forms of coal to the coal severance tax. 427
Furthermore, the court found that the tax was enacted "to
compensate the state for the depletion of its resources and to raise
revenue for impact Costs. "428 The court concluded that the
depletion of a resource, rather than its eventual use as a fuel, was
the determining factor in mandating the application of the
severance tax. 129 On that basis, the court upheld the determination
of the tax commissioner that leonardite was "coal" for purposes of
chapter 57-61 and was therefore subject to the coal severance tax. 430
Texaro Oil Co. v. Mosser
In Texaro Oil Co. v. Mosser,431 the court distinguished between a
"royalty interest" and a "mineral interest." The case involved an
action to quiet title to an undivided, one-half interest in "oil, gas,
and other minerals. "432 Three parties claimed an interest in the
one-half mineral interest, 433 but the total of the three claims
exceeded the available one-half mineral interest. 434
The claims arose in the following manner. In March of 1952,
the record owner was Cooper. On October 28, 1955, Cooper gave
an option to purchase a royalty interest to Mosser. On April 15,
1958, O'Connell's predecessor in interest acquired a notice of
attachment against the property. In July of 1958, Texaro's
predecessors in interest obtained a mineral deed from Cooper. In
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 55.
427. Id. at 56.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 56-57.
431. 299 N.W.2d 191 (N.D. 1980).
432. Texaro Oil Co. v. Mosser, 299 N.W.2d 191, 192 (N.D. 1980).
433. Id.
434. Id. at 192-93.
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December of 1959, a judgment was entered against the property
which had previously been attached. On April 18, 1960, the
Mosser's obtained a mineral deed from Cooper. On June 2, 1960,
a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was issued. Finally, on June 6, 1961,
O'Connell's predecessor in interest obtained a Sheriff's Deed for
the property. The issue before the court was whether the Mosser's
option to obtain a royalty interest included the right to purchase a
mineral interest in the form of a mineral deed. 435
Imperative to the court's analysis was the definition of the
terms "royalty interest" and "mineral interest.'' 436 The court
defined a "royalty interest" as a personal property interest, "the
owner's right to receive a certain part of the proceeds from oil and
gas, [sic] leases if and when there is production. 4 37 A "mineral
interest" was defined as a real property interest in oil and gas in
place, "the right to enter the land to explore, drill, produce and
otherwise carry on mining activities. ,438  Based on these
definitions, the court determined that "royalty interests" and
"mineral interests" were "totally separable terms with distinct
characteristics. " 439 The court also noted that the mineral deed
differed from the option to purchase a royalty interest in that
different grantees as well as different quantities were involved in
each document. 4 0 Thus, the court concluded that the Mossers'
option to purchase a royalty interest "was not exercised by the
mineral deed.' '441
The Mossers also urged a reformation of the mineral deed to
comply with the option to purchase a royalty interest. The court
refused to allow a reformation because the evidence did not
convincingly support such a reformation. 4 2 Consequently, the
Mossers' mineral deed was not allowed to relate back to the time of
the option to purchase a "royalty interest," and their interest in the
minerals was subject not only to Texaro's mineral deed but also to
O'Connell's claim under the sheriff's deed.4 43
PROPERTY
Minnkota Power Cooperative v. Lake Shure Properties
In Minnkota Power Cooperative v. Lake Shure Properties, 4 4 the
435. Id. at 194.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 195.
443. Id.
444. 295 N.W.2d 122 (N.D. 1980).
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supreme court affirmed the district court's reinstatement of the
original judgment in the case, permanently enjoining Lake Shure
Properties from prohibiting, restricting, or interfering with
Minnkota's entry onto its property. Minnkota sought entry for the
purpose of modifying and uprating certain electric transmission
lines.4 45 In an earlier case, 446 the supreme court had reversed the
district court's judgment allowing the injunction because the notice
of certain hearings given to Lake Shure by the Public Service
Commission was defective.4 7 The supreme court reasoned that
because its earlier reversal was qualified, and because it had
expressly reserved judgment on the merits in its original opinion,"48
the district court had not acted improperly by incorporating the
pre-remand judgment into the post-remand judgment. 4 9
After concluding that the district court had acted properly in
reinstating the judgment, the court went on to consider the merits
of the case. The supreme court determined that because Lake
Shure had made no reservations in the original easement with
Minnkota regarding the capacity of the power line or its voltage,
the rights granted to the utility included the right to uprate the line
to a reasonable degree. 450 Furthermore, the court concluded that
the uprating of the transmission line from 230 kilovolts to 345
kilovolts was reasonable. 4 5'
The landowner in Minnkota Power argued that the court's
finding would result in power companies' gradually uprating power
through transmission lines. 452 The court rejected this argument,
however, reasoning that each increase in power would have to
relate back to the time and terms of the original easement. 453
Yegen v. City of Bismarck
The case of Yegen v. City of Bismarck 54 arose as a result of the
city's ban on curbside on-street parking on certain streets. The
plaintiff in Yegen owned and operated a grocery store located on one
of the streets affected by the ban. 455 She asserted that "the 'loss of
access' to reasonable parking for customers or deliverymen
445. Minnkota Power Coop. v. Lake Shure Prop., 295 N.W.2d 122 (N.D. 1980).
446. Minnkota Power Coop. v. Lake Shure Prop., 289 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1980).
447. Id. at 233.
448. Id. at 231.
449. 295 N.W.2d at 124.
450. Id. at 127.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. 291 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1980).
455. Yegen v. City ofBismarck, 291 N.W.2d 422, 423 (N.D. 1980).
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constituted a taking of private property without just
compensation. "1456
The supreme court characterized the plaintiff's contention as
a claim to the free and unrestricted flow of traffic past her
premises .45  The court noted, however, that even though a
property owner has a right of reasonable ingress and egress onto the
street, he has no vested interest in the flow of traffic past his
property. 45 8 Furthermore, the court stated that parking on public
thoroughfares is a privilege rather than a right and is therefore
subject to reasonable regulations under the police power.459 Thus,
the court concluded that not only was the ban on parking a proper
exercise of the city's police power, but because the plaintiff's
ingress and egress from the street were not disturbed, no taking of
property resulted. 4
60
The plaintiff in Yegen cited an early North Dakota case,
Donovan v. Albert, 46i for the proposition that the loss was
compensable because the prohibition against parking on the street
was not contemplated and did not exist at the time the street was
dedicated. 46 2 In Donovan, the court found that if an abutting
landowner's use of the street is obstructed for any public purpose
inconsistent with the primary purpose of the original dedication to
the public, then the property owner is entitled to compensation.
463
The supreme court in Yegen, however, found the prohibition of
parking to be consistent with the primary use of the street as
originally dedicated, that purpose being for travel.
464
Goodman Investment, Inc. v. Swanston Equipment Co.
The supreme court's construction of the notice to quit
requirement of North Dakota's forcible detainer statutes465 was at
issue in Goodman Investment, Inc. v. Swanston Equipment Co. 4 66 The
case arose when Goodman attempted to regain possession of certain
leased property from Swanston. Goodman claimed that a forfeiture
of the lease had occurred because the rent had not been paid for
three months. 46
7
456. Id. at 423.
457. Id. at 424.
458. Id. at 425.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 426.
461. 11 N.D. 289, 91 N.W. 441 (1902).
462. 291 N.W. 2d at 425.
463. Donovan v. Albert, 11 N.D. 289, 293, 91 N.W. 441, 443 (1902).
464. 291 N.W.2d at 426.
465. N.D. CENT. CODE S 33-06-02 (1976).
466. 299 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1980).
467. Goodman Inv., Inc. v. Swanston Equip. Co., 299 N.W.2d 786, 787 (N.D. 1980).
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Section 33-06-02 of the North Dakota Century Code requires
that a lessee be given three days written notice to quit before
forcible detainer proceedings can be instituted. 468 Goodman argued
that the purpose of this provision was simply to notify the lessee
that he had three days to vacate the property before legal action
would be taken to evict him. 469 The court, however, found that
section 33-06-02 was designed to obviate the common law
requirement that there be a demand for payment by the lessor and
a refusal by the lessee before an action could be brought. 47 0 Thus,
the court affirmed the dismissal of the lessor's complaint because
the lessee had tendered the unpaid rent plus interest within three
days after service of the notice to quit. 47 1 The court relied upon
decisions by the supreme courts of Iowa and South Dakota in which
similar statutes had been construed to allow payment of rent due
after service of the notice to quit. 472 The court also noted that
chapter 33-06 of the North Dakota Century Code has no provision
that the failure to pay rent results in a forfeiture. 47 3 Therefore, the
court rejected Goodman's argument that the forfeiture of a lease for
nonpayment of rent is automatic once the notice to quit had been
served, and concluded that section 33-06-02 permits the lessee to
pay the rent within three days. 47
4
TAXATION
United Power Association v. Board of County Commissioners
The definition of the term "coal conversion facility" in
chapter 57-60 of the North Dakota Century Code was examined by
the supreme court in United Power Association v. Board of County
Commissioners. 75
The appellant appealed from the McLean County district
court's reversal of the North Dakota Tax Appeal Board's order
granting appellant's application for abatement of real property ad
valorem taxes. The taxes were assessed by the Board against
appellant's Coal Creek generating plant while it was under
construction. 476 Chapter 57-60 imposes a privilege tax on all coal
468. N.D. CENT. CODE § 33-06-02 (1976).
469. 299 N.W.2d at 788.
470. Id. at 789.
471. Id. at 790-92.
472. Id. at 788-89.
473. Id. at 789.
474. Id. at 789-90.
475. 300 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1980).
476. United Power Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 300 N.W.2d 36, 37 (N.D. 1980).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
conversion facilities based upon their production, 47 7 but exempts
such facilities from ad valorem taxes. 478 Appellee contended that
the facility did not qualify for the exemption as it could not meet the
statutory definition of an electric generation facility 47 9 until it was
completed and actually generating electricity. 48 0 In rejecting the
appellee's argument, the court found the statute "clear and
unambiguous" 48 1 and held that the term "coal conversion facility"
encompasses a plant under construction prior to operation. 482
Erdle v. Dorgan
North Dakota's system of determining a taxpayer's taxable
income according to federal law was examined by the court in Erdle
v. Dorgan.483 The court had occasion to address this issue previously
in Lanterman v. Dorgan.484 There, the court held that section 57-38-
01(20) of the North Dakota. Century Code requires that
adjustments to the federal taxable income figure cannot be made on
state tax returns unless the adjustment is expressly provided for by
statute. 48 5 The tax commissioner argued that unless the taxpayer in
Erdle was required to treat his income from the liquidation of a
corporation alike on both his federal and state returns, some of his
income would escape taxation.4 8 6  The court rejected his
interpretation of Lanterman and reiterated its earlier holding. 487 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Vande Walle noted the tax
commissioner's contention that some legislators felt the court's
decision in Lanterman was an incorrect construction of the statute. 48
Justice Vande Walle reasoned, however, that because there had
been no legislative action to alter the Lanterman decision, he had to
concur with the majority. 489
TORTS
South v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
In South v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 490 the court upheld
477. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 57-60-02 (1979).
478. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-60-06 (1979).
479. N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-60-01 (2) (b) (1979).
480. 300 N.W.2d at 38-39.
481. Id. at 38.
482. Id.
483. 300 N.W.2d 834 (N.D. 1980).
484. 255 N.W.2d 891 (N.D. 1977).
485. Lanterman v. Dorgan, 255 N.W.2d 891, 894 (N.D. 1977).
486. Erdle v. Dorgan, 300 N.W.2d 834, 837 (N.D. 1980).
487. Id.
488. Id. at 839 (Vande Walle, J., concurring).
489. Id. (Vande Walle, .. , concurring).
490. 290 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1980).
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the jury verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs and addressed several
noteworthy tort issues. 4 91 Plaintiffs sued for damages for injuries
sustained in a collision with defendants' train at a railroad crossing
in the city of Larimore.4 92 The driver sued the defendants,4 93
collectively referred to as the "Railroad," on a theory of
negligence, and his wife sued for damages incurred through loss of
consortium.4 94 The jury found the Railroad one hundred per cent
negligent and awarded damages to both plaintiffs. 4 95
The Railroad's appeal raised numerous issues. One significant
tort issue was whether "a jury should be instructed to consider the
negligence of non-parties for apportionment purposes. 4 96 The
Railroad asserted that the trial court committed reversible error
when it refused to instruct the jury to consider the negligence of the
city of Larimore, a non-party to the proceeding.4 97 The court
declined to decide the issue, stating that it was both "unnecessary
and improvident. "498 "Consideration by the jury of the negligence
of the city of Larimore could not have changed its determination
that [the plaintiff] was not negligent nor its determination that the
Railroad was negligent. "'99 Also, the comparative negligence act
provides that jointly liable tortfeasors "each shall remain jointly
and severally liable for the whole award. ' 500 Thus, the Railroad
was liable to the plaintiffs for the whole award irrespective of any
apportionment of negligence. 501
Another tort issue addressed was whether an individual has
"an affirmative duty to render asistance to an injured person, and,
if so, under what circumstances. "502 The court rejected the
Railroad's assertion that the trial court committed eiror in
admitting evidence of the train engineer's failure to render
assistance after the accident. 50 3 Citing to the Restatement (Second)
491. South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 823-24 (N.D. 1980).
492. Id. at 824.
493. Id. at 823. There were four defendants in this action: National Railroad Passenger Corp.
(AMTRAK); Burlington Northern Railroad, Inc.; Leslie Roy Strom; and the estate of Howard
Decker, who was the train engineer at the time of the accident. Id.
494. Id. at 824.
495. Id. Thejury awarded damages of $935,000 to the motorist and $125,000 to his wife. Id.
496. 290 N.W.2d at 825.
497. Id. at 824-25. The city of Larimore originally had beenjoined as party by the plaintiffs, but
prior to trial, the trial court granted the city's motion to be dismissed. Id. at 825. The plaintiffs failed
to file timely briefs in appealing the dismissal, and the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed their
appeal. Id. at 825.
498. 290 N.W.2d at 825.
499. Id.
500. N.D. CENT. CoDE S 9-10-07 (1975).
501. 290 N.W.2d at 825.
502. Id. at 836.
503. Id. The plaintiffs contended that the engineer had an affirmative duty to assist by virtue of
section 39-08-06 of the North Dakota Century Code. 290 N.W.2d at 836. Seealso N.D. CENT. CODE §
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of Torts,50 4 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated the following:
[A] person who knows or has reason to know that his
conduct, whether tortious or innocent, has caused harm
to another has an affirmative duty to render assistance to
prevent further harm. One who breaches such duty is
subject to liability for damages incurred as a result of the
additional harm proximately caused by such breach. 50 5
The Railroad's appeal also raised the issue of whether "an
injured person may recover, as an element of damages, the
reasonable value of medical care and treatment which is provided
gratuitously.' '506 The Railroad's assertion that the plaintiffs had
not, and would not in the future, incur nursing care expenses was
rejected. 50 7 The court stated that a "tortfeasor should not be
allowed to benefit from an injured person's good fortune of having
available to him gratuitous medical care." ' 508 Thus, the court
adopted the rule that an injured person can recover for care or
treatment provided gratuitously . 50 9
Van Vleet v. Pfeifle
In Van Vleet v. Pfeifle, 510 a summary judgment entered by the
Burleigh County district court for the defendant in a medical
malpractaice action for the wrongful death of plaintiff's husband
was overturned. 5 1 ' The plaintiff had alleged in her complaint that
the three defendant physicians had negligently failed to discover the
decedent's lung cancer and thereby prematurely caused his
death. 512 The trial court ruled that the widow's wrongful death
claim was not a provable fact because the doctors were not
responsible for the cancerous condition from which Mr. Van Vleet
died. 513
In remanding for a new trial, the supreme court held that
39-08-06 (1979) (imposes on the "driver of any vehicle" a duty to assist). The court ruled, however,
that a train was excluded from the definition of "vehicle." 290 N.W.2d at 836.
504. Id. at 837 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §322 (1965)).
505. 290 N.W.2d at 837.
506. Id. at 841.
507. Id. at 841-42.
508. Id. at 842.
509. Id.
510. 289 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 1980).
511. VanVleet v. Pfeifle,.289 N.W.2d 781, 782 (N.D. 1980).
512. Id. at 783. Mrs. Van Vleet alleged that the physicians negligently failed to have a timely
bronchoscopy performed on Mr. Van Vleet and negligently failed to advise him to have one
performed. Id. Bronchoscopy is a procedure for examining the upper respiratory tract for cancer and
disease. Id. at 782 n. 1.
513. 289 N.W.2d at 783.
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"proof of a severed opportunity for .. . life could also form the
foundation of an action for wrongful death." 514 The court reasoned
that if the doctors in this case were negligent in failing to discover
the decedent's cancerous condition and thereby hastened and
prematurely caused his death, the doctors should not escape
liability under the wrongful death act "simply because the cancer
would eventually have resulted in Van Vleet's death even if it were
discovered sooner."515
The court also considered whether any genuine issues of
material fact existed which would preclude the granting of a
summary judgment. 516 The defendants contended that because no
medical person could testify as a matter of reasonable medical
probability that decedent's life would have been extended had the
cancer been discovered sooner, no genuine issue of causation
existed. 517 Rejecting the defendants' argument, 518 the court noted
other policy reasons for denying summary judgments in medical
malpractice cases, including the reluctance of members of the
medical profession to testify against fellow physicians, 519 and the
fact that issues of negligence and proximate cause ordinarily should
be tried and should not be determined in summary judgment
proceedings. 520 Finally, the court noted that the evidence in the
record raised a genuine issue of fact as to a causal relationship
between the actions of the three physicians and the subsequent
death of Mr. Van Vleet. 521
Latendresse v. Preskey
The supreme court considered two important workmen's
compensation cases in 1980. In Latendresse v. Preskey,522 the court
addressed the issue of whether the "dual capacity doctrine" created
an exception or modification of the North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Act. 52 3 The plaintiff-employee appealed a summary
514. Id.
515. Id. at 783-84. "The North Dakota wrongful death act ... entitled the surviving spouse of
a person whose death was wrongfully caused by the negligent actions of another to maintain an
action and recover damages in the same manner as the decedent was entitled if the death had not
ensued." Id. (citations omitted). Seealso N.D. CENT. COoE ch. 32-21 (1976) (Wrongful Death Act).
516. Id. at 784. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 56 (procedure for granting summary judgment).
517. 289 N.W.2d at 784.
518. Id. at 784-86.
519. Id. at 784. The court cited 4inkier v. Herr: "ITlrial courts stL uld be t'xtrenis!v cautious in
entering summary .judgments in medical malpractice cases because of a lack of expert testimony."
Id. at 784. See also Winkjer v. Herr, 277 N.W.2d 579, 589 (N.D. 1979).
520. 289 N.W.2d at 784.
521. Id. at 785. The court stated that the "totality of the evidence in the record, raised a genuine
issue of fact in this case .... - Id.
522. 290 N.W.2d 267 (N.D. 1980).
523. Latendresse v. Preskey. 290 N.W.2d 267, 269 (N.D. 1980). See N.D. CENT. COoE tit. 65
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• judgment dismissal in a suit against his employer for injuries he
sustained during the course of his employment while installing a
steel pin in a customer's machine.5 24 The supreme court affirmed
the dismissal. 52 5
The "dual capacity doctrine" provides that "an employer
normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy
principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he
occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a second capacity
that confers on him obligations independent of those imposed on
him as employer. "526 The claimant alleged that his employer fell
within the doctrine because he acted in the "dual capacity" of
employer and manufacturer in producing the defective steel pin. 527
The court rejected the employee's argument on two grounds.
First, the court found that the claimant had failed to establish that
the employer came within the "dual capacity doctrine. "528 "Dual
capacity requires a distinct separate legal persona not just a separate
theory of liability of the same legal person. "529 Second, the court
noted that recognition of the doctrine would result in improper
abrogation of the workmen's compensation laws.5 30 The court,
therefore, adhered to its findings in Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors,
Inc., 53 1 and rejected the "doctrine of dual capacity." 53 2
Gernand v. Ost Services, Inc.
In Gernand v. Ost Services, Inc., 533 the court confronted the issue
of whether a third party tortfeasor, in a suit by an employee, may
seek contribution from the employer whose concurring negligence
contributed to the employee's injury. 534  The majority of
jurisdictions find that the "exclusive remedy provisions" of the
(1960 & Supp. 1979). (Workmen's Compensation Act). In this case, the plaintiff-employee had
applied for and received workmen's compensation benefits. 290 N.W.2d at 270.
524. 290 N.W.2d at 268-69.
525. Id. at 272.
526. Id. at 270 (quoting from 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.80,
at 14-112 (1976)).
527. 290 N.W.2d at 269. Although the employee alleged that the employer had manufactured
the steel pin, there was no evidence that it was manufactured for sale to the public. Id.
528. Id. at 272.
529. Id. at 271 (quoting from 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW oF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.80
(14-112), at 167 (Supp. 1980)).
530. 290 N.W.2d at 272.
531. 268 N.W.2d 466, 474 (N.D. 1978) "The North Dakota W'orkmen's Compensation Act
does not permit the application of the dual capacity theory." Id.
532. 290 N.W.2d at 272.
533. 298 N.W.2d 500 (N.D. 1980),
534. Gernand v. Ost Serv., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 500, 504 (N.D. 1980). A city maintenance
employee filed an action against a company hired by the city for injuries suffered in a work-related
injury, alleging that the company negligently caused his injuries. The company, in turn, filed third
party complaint against the city. Id. at 502-03.
309
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workmen's compensation statutes53 5 immunize the employer from
suits by the employee and third party tortfeasors. 53 6 Also, the
"subrogation provisions" of the compensation laws foreclose any
right of contribution a third party might have. 53 7 Thus, when a
third party is a jointly liable tortfeasor, the third party becomes
liable for all the employee's damages, including the benefits paid by
workmeh's compensation, regardless of the amount of fault
attributable to the employer. 3 8 In an attempt to work out an
equitable compromise to the "all or nothing" liability of a third
party tortfeasor, a minority of jurisdictions has judicially adopted
rules of "limited contribution. ,,539
In Gernand, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
bar any suit by a third party against a contributorily negligent
employer whether the suit arises under common law or under the
contribution statutes.5 40 The court noted that section 65-05-06 of
the North Dakota Century Code541 explicitly provides that
payment of compensation by the bureau to an injured employee
"shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action, whatsoever, against
the employer. "1542 The court also implicitly followed the majority
position and refused to make any equitable modifications of the
workmen's compensation laws concerning their effect on third
party tortfeasors. 54 3 The court noted in dictum that "[any change
in the exclusive remedy provisions and in the subrogation
provisions [was] more appropriately a matter for the legislature's
consideration. "54
Law v. Maercklein
In Law v. Maercklein, ' 4 5 the appellant, a nonresident of North
Dakota, sought to recover the unpaid balance of a prior judgment
535. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-28; 65-05-06 (1960) (exclusive remedy provisions).
536. 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 76.00, at 14-287 (1976).
537. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-01-09 (Supp. 1979) (subrogation provisions).
538. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 74.00 & § 75.22 (1976) (The overall
result of the various types of subrogation provisions is reimbursement of the payor of compensation).
539. See id. § 76.22. For example, one approach allows the third party to recover contribution
from the employer up to the amount of workmen's compensation benefits available. Another
approach allows the third party to obtain "fictional" contribution by reducing the award of damages
to the employee by an amount proportionate to the percentage of fault attributable to the employer.
540. 298 N.W.2d at 504-05.
541. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 65-05-06 (1960).
542. 298 N.W.2d at 505.
543. But see Kraft, The North Dakota Equity For Tortfeasors Struggle - Judicial Action v. Legislative
Over-Reaction, 56 N.D.L. REv. 67, 82-86, (1980) (author suggests that Barrels v. City of Williston,
276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979), provides a precedential contribution formula for making the necessary
equitable modifications to prevent third party tortfeasors from shouldering total responsibility).
544. 298 N.W.2d at 505.
545. 292 N.W.2d 86 (N.D. 1980).
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from North Dakota's Unsatisfied Judgment Fund (Fund).546 Law
had received her judgment in an action brought for thie wrongful
death of her son, a resident of North Dakota, who was killed in an
automobile accident. 47 The district court held that she was not
entitled to recover from the Fund because section 39-17-03 of the
North Dakota Century Code548 restricted participation to North
Dakota residents .549
On appeal to the supreme court, Law argued that, in light of
the court's desire to liberally construe the unsatisfied judgment
fund law, the residency of the person injured or killed should be the
determinative factor in allowing recourse from the Fund. 550 The
court, however, noting that it could not ignore the plain wording of
the statute, rejected the appellant's interpretation of section 39-17-
03 and held that the Fund's "applicants must be North Dakota
residents." 5  1 Because wrongful death claims are brought on behalf
of the decedent's survivors and not on the decendent's behalf,5 52
the court ruled that wrongful death judgments received by
nonresidents may not be satisfied out of the Fund.553 The supreme
court also upheld the constitutionality of the residency requirement
of section 39-17-03, 55 4 finding that the restriction did not violate
either the privileges and immunities clause 551 or the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution. 56
WILLS
In re Estate ofJosephson
In In re Estate of Josephson,557 Michael Josephson, a minor,
546. Law v. Maercklein, 292 N.W.2d 86, 88 (N.D. 1980).
547. Id. at 88. Mrs. Law, pursuant to stipulation, was awarded judgment for $10,203.40 against
the estate of the driver of the automobile in which her son was riding. She received $4,000 from the
insurance carrier covering the auto. Id.
548. N.D. CENT. CooE § 39-17-03 (1980). The statute provides in relevant part as follows:
Where any person, who is a resident of this state, recovers in any court in this
state a judgment for an amount exceeding three hundred dollars in an action for
damages resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of, any person occasioned by, or
arising out of, the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of a motor vehicle by the
judgment debtor in this state, upon such judgment becoming final, such judgment
creditor may, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, apply to the judge of
the district court in which such judgment was rendered, upon notice to the attorney
general, for an order directing payment of thejudgment out of said fund.
Id.
549. 292 N.W.2d at 88.
550. Id. at 88-89.
551. Id. at 89.
552. Id. at 88-89. Survivor actions are merely a continuation of the decedent's claim. A
wrongful death action, on the other hand, is an entirely new cause of action; it is brought to
compensate the decedent's survivors. Id. at 89.
553. Id. at 89. The court did not consider whether the decedent's estate, in an action under the
survival statute, would be a "resident" for purposes of section 39-17-03. Id. at 88 n. 1. See also N.D.
CENT. CODE 5 39-17-03 (1980).
554. 292 N.W.2d at90.
555. Id. at 90-91.
556. Id. at 92.
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appealed from the district court ruling that he was not entitled to
inherit from his parents' estates because he had caused their
deaths.558 The district court relied on section 30.1-10-03 of the
North Dakota Century Code, which provides that one who
intentionally and feloniously kills another is not entitled to receive
any benefits from his victim's estate. 559 Michael contended that
chapter 27-20 of the North Dakota Century Code was the
controlling statute. 560 That statute prohibits a conclusion that a
minor can commit a felony. Michael therefore argued that, as a
minor, he could not commit a felony under the statute, and thus,
should not be barred from inheriting.5 61 Michael interpreted
"felonious" in section 30.1-10-03 of the North Dakota Century
Code to mean the intentional doing of an act which constitutes a
felony by statute. 562
The supreme court held that the correct interpretation of
"felonious" as used in section 30.1-10-03 of the North Dakota
Century Code refers to a killing that is wrongful and without
justification or legal excuse. 563 The court also noted that a criminal
conviction of a felony is not required, and in the absence of a
criminal conviction, the felonious and intentional killing can be
proved in a civil proceeding by a preponderance of the evidence. 564
Therefore, the court found that even though Michael, as a minor,
could not be convicted of a felony, his wrongful act of feloniously
and intentionally killing his parents rightfully prohibited his
inheritance.565
The court noted that the determination that Michael had
feloniously killed his parents was not a conviction of a felony, 566 but
a civil disaility which prevents Michael from inheriting from the
557. 297 N.W.2d 444 (N.D. 1980).
558. In re Estate ofJosephson, 297 N.W.2d 444, 446 (N.D. 1980).
559. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (1) (1976).
560. 297 N.W.2d at 446-447. Chapter 27-20 of the North Dakota Century Code is the Uniform
Juvenile Court Act. Section 27-20-02 (2) provides in part as follows: " 'Delinquent act' means an act
designated a crime under the law, including local ordinances or resolutions of this state, or of another
state if the act occurred in that state, or under federal law. ... N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02 (2)
(Supp. 1979).
561. 297 N.W.2d at 447..
562. Id. at 448.
563. Id-
564. Id. at 449. Section 30.1-10-03 (5) provides in part as follows:
A final judgment of conviction of felonious and intentional killing is conclusive for
purposes of this section. In the absence of a conviction of felonious and intentional
killing, the court may determine by a preponderance of evidence whether the killing
was felonious and intentional for the purposes of this section.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (5) (1976).
565. 297 N.W.2d at 449.
566. Id.
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decedent's estate.5 67 The court further noted that this holding does
not violate the bar placed on the use of evidence from a juvenile
court hearing in another hearing568 because section 30.1-10-03
imposes a statutory civil disability separate and apart from any
juvenile hearing. 569
Michael also contended that his parents' estate is required to
support him until he reaches the age of majority.570 To this
contention the court again found section 30.1-10-03(1) of the North
Dakota Century Code controlling and held that support payments
constitute "benefits" from the estate and therefore are not
recoverable.571
The significance of this case is the application of North Dakota
Century Code section 30.1-10-03 to a minor who feloniously and
intentionally causes the death of the decedent. The minor is
prohibited from receiving benefits from that decedent's estate. The
court determined that this holding is consistent with public policy
and does not contradict the purposes of the Uniform Juvenile
Court Act. 72
567. Id.
568. Id. at 447. Section 27-20-33 (2) of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
The disposition of a child and evidence adduced in a hearing in juvenile court may not
be used against him in any proceeding in any court other than a juvenile court,
whether before or after reaching majority, except in dispositional proceedings after
conviction of a felony for the purposes of a presentence investigation and report.
N.D. CENT. COoE S 27-20-33 (1974).
569. 297 N.W.2d at 447.
570. Id. at 449. Section 14-09-08 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in part:
"The parent entitled to the custody of a child must give him support and education suitable to his
circumstances .... " N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-09-08 (1971). Section 14-09-12 provides as follows:
If a parent chargeable with the support of a child dies leaving it chargeable upon
the county and leaving an estate sufficient for its support, the board of county
commissioners of the county, in the name of the county, may claim provision for its
support from the parent's estate by civil action, and for this purpose may have the
same remedies as any creditor against that estate and against the heirs, devisees, and
next of kin of the parent.
N.D. CENT. COOE § 14-09-12 (1971).
571. 297 N.W.2d at 449-50.
572. Id. at 449.
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